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Locking the Doors
When I was growing uP and until mY
20s, it was not uncommon to leave the
doors to the familY home and car
unlocked. Security was not an issue in
most neighborhoods, and there was
always the unofficial neighborhood
watch (that delightful well-informed
neighbor). Yes, times have changed'
Communications technology must
now cope with traP doors, worms,
hoaxes, Trojan horses, and thousands
of viruses.
While recentlY Planning for the
renovation to mY home, even in the
remote location of Sewanee, Tennessee,
I included the cost of installing a state-
of-the art home securitY sYstem. I
justified it by telling everyone that it
was for fire Protection, but like
everyone I am beginning to worry
about security. The point being, the
good ole days are long gone. Security is
an issue regardless of what medium
you are trying to protect. It is no longer
a simple means of Protection bY
locking the data center doors as we
could 20-plus Years ago when most
applications were run in batch mode
with no remote access. The Internet
has brought everyone to our back
door. Computer networks have
revolutionized the way we do business,
but the risks involved can be fatal due
to loss of funds, time, and-thank
goodness in rare cases-life'
One of the major issues of network
security is to keep information that is
key to the organization confidential
and assure PrivacY to Protect the
organization from damage or loss that
could occur from the disclosure of the
confidential information. The integrity
and accountability of the information
is also key to the success of the
organization. As in any business, upper
management makes decisions based
upon sound financial analysis. While it
is important to keeP information
confidential and accountable, informa-
tion must be accessible on the network
for prospective students, employees,
and administration in order to make
appropriate decisions. How can a
business feel secure while at the same
time providing accessibility to its
assets?
Since September 11, whom or what
to trust has become a key concern. How
do we protect ourselves from danger
and provide the services that our
employees and customers expect? How
do we protect our identity? Identifica-
tion, authentication, authorization, and
cryptography continue to be developed
and improved. The revolution of e-
commerce is transforming personal
data into a commodity. This privacy
drain will continue.
According to Dr' Lance Hoffman, a
professor of comPuter science at
George Washington UniversitY and
director of the School of Engineering's
Cyberspace Policy Institute, "We will
also see increased use o[ screening
browsers built into handheld devices,
such as PDAs. Starting with the
Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS) for content control, we will
proceed to filter interaction rules as
well as content rules using mechanisms
like the Platform for Privacy Prefer-
ences (P3P), which enables Web sites to
express their privacy practices-and
users to exercise (automatically, if
desired) preferences over those
practices. P3P will support digital
certificate and digital signature
capabilities and can be incorporated
into browsers, servers) or ProxY
servers,"
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On May 25,2000, Richard D.
Pethia, director of the CERT' Centers
SoRware Engineering Institute at
Carnegie Mellon University, testified
before the U. S. Senate fudiciary
Committee: "[T]he recent rash of
attacks on the Internet demonstrates
how quickly automated attacks can
spread across the network and hints at
the kind of damage that can be done.
Incident response organizations are
able to limit damage by working
effectively together to analyze the
problem, synthesize solutions, and alert
the community to the need to take
corrective action ... The long-term
solutions to the problems represented
by new forms of automated attack will
require fundamental changes to the
way technology is developed, packaged,
and used. It is critical that system
operators and product developers
recognize that their systems and
products are now operating in hostile
environments ... As new forms of
attack are identified and understood,
developers must change their designs to
protect systems and networks from
these kinds of attacks." (hrqil
www.cert. org/congressionaltestimony
Pethia_testimony25May00.html)
The popularity and ease of
installation of wireless technology is
only making security breaches easier.
Wireless access point devices are
plugged directly into an enterprise
network. Employees are bringing access
points through the back door without
the communication technology folks
even knowing they are on the premises.
With a $99 wireless LAN card someone
can transmit sensitive data while sitting
in an adjacent parking lot. Serious
hackers can even use long-range
antennas from a distance of 1,000 to
2,000 feet.
It is never too late to plan and
implement security and privacy
policies and practices. The articles in
this issue of the journal are intended to
provide experience and guidelines on
security and privacy issues. As commu-
nication technology networks grow
more complex, no one person can be
expected to control all aspects relating
to security. It is also more effective if
the process of security and privacy
issues start from the top. Offense seems
to have significant advantages over
delense in most cases as it is more
effective to identi$z and try to manage
security risks up front than to imple-
ment damage control later.
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System Security Policy: What lt ls and
Why Every CamPus Needs One
Our concerns about system security
continually increase-and not without
justification. Crimes reported to the
Computer EmergencY ResPonse Team
(CERT) more than doubled in each of the
last three years, increasing ftom 252 ln
1990 to 52,648 in 2001. And if the security
threats from the outside aren't enough,
colleges and universities face the addi-
tional challenge of protecting themselves
from accidental and intentional threats
posed by an exceptionally intelligent and
curious internal communitY. The
academic world promotes curiosity,
fostering an environment conducive for
inquiring minds to peek, poke, peer, and
penetrate. Clearly, a system security policy
is essential.
What ls a System SecuritY PolicY?
A system security policy is a document
that establishes our priority for securing
our systems. It prevents the loss of assets,
identifies and mitigates our risks, and
minimizes the impact of security breaches
on organizational assets. A security policy
identifies the assets we're trying to protect,
documents the vulnerabilities posed
against those assets, and plots a strategy to
protect those assets, including hardware,
software, intellectual ProPerty, private
information, documentation, goodwill
and reputation, PeoPle and skills.
The security policy is a living docu-
ment that organizations must modifr as
information assets change and as the
threats against those assets change. It
provides a framework for which we select,
implement, and configure our systems
and networks. Finally, the security policy
provides standards of use for the
organization's resources, removing
excuses for unacceptable behavior' A
security policY is more than just a
document that sPecifies rules and
concepts of how to protect our systems'
It's a process. The security policy is a
series of decisions balancing the need for
security versus cost, capability, and
convenience.
The security policy provides a vehicle
for us to make decisions with regard to
other important PolicY matters:
. It affects budgeting for security-
related measures and all IT projects
. It affects how we select, configure,
back up, and manage our systems
. It determines how we react to a
security breach
Why Do We Need a SecuritY PolicY?
The security policy serves as a blueprint
for our security architecture. We need to
make sure that our policies are followed,
so we must document them. After all, an
unwritten policy is no policy at all. We
further need to audit practice against
policy to ensure adherence, so we know
our security practices are effective. Lastly,
we can review the written policy to ensure
that our protection is up-to-date and
relevant.
How do we know our systems are
secure without defining what secure
means? An organization can say"'We've
never been attacked," but how do we
know? Digital assets are so extensive that
there is no practical way to check them
individually. Without a policy and
procedures to implement it, we can't
really know if we've been attacked. The
security policy doesn't just define what
secure means-it identifies how it's
measured.
The security policy process requires us
to decide our institution's tolerance for
risk. We then determine the resource
commitment we're going to make to
ensure we reach that level of acceptable
risk. As part of this Process, we balance
the need for security with the need for
capability; the cost of securing systems
versus the cost associated with security
breaches; the need to keeP Private
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information confidential, systems
available, and data sources reliable
yersus the inconvenience and practi-
cality of our security policy ramifica-
tions.
As part of the security policy
process, we ask. "What are we trying to
protect?" Do we have sensitive data
such as credit card numbers, ACH
(direct deposit) numbers, patient
records, social security numbers,
financial records, student records,
donor history, and investment
inlormation? Do we have proprietary
research data or other intellectual
property we must protect? Do we have
information that health insurance
portability and accountability act of
1996 (HIPAA) mandates us to protect?
Lastly, in a crisis, unprepared staff
can make precipitous and inappropri-
ate decisions. The security policy
process not only reduces such oppor-
tunities, it also should dictate who has
the autonomy to make which decisions
under what circumstances.
What Are the Characteristics ol a Security
Policy?
Most important is that the policy be
both accepted and enforceable.
Security breaches inevitably follow if
our systems'users don't follow the
rules. Furthermore, if we can't enforce
policy, what makes us think that
people will follow the rules?
The security policy must be useful
and easy-to-understand. We want to
structure the security policy so that we
can easily locate important informa-
tion. Top-level management must
sanction the document as official. The
document must be carefully worded to
avoid confusion. The policy should
have definitions included to eliminate
ambiguity from the document. The
policy's wording can determine
criminality should someone violate its
precepts. The document should
provide guidelines rather than
procedures. (Often procedures follow
naturally from the guidelines). Each
revision ofthe security policy should
have a version number and date of
revision.
One feature often forgotten by
security administrators is that the
policy should be well advertised and
well understood. We can accomplish
this through publicity and training.
The policy itself should document how
the document should be publicized.
We publish applicable sections to those
entities for which those sections apply.
We can do this because we have
organized the policy into discrete
sections.
One important component of
advertising is to mandate a log-on
banner. A log-on banner mandating
appropriate use of systems eliminates
the "I didn't know" excuse for security
breaches. In many states, Iack of a log-
on banner prohibiting unauthorized
use limits criminal proseculion.
We shou[d review our security
policy at least once per year to ensure
that it is up-to-date. We should also
specify other times that would be
appropriate for review-for example,
it would only follow that we mandate a
review of our security policy after a
major security incident occurs. Of
course, in our tightly worded policy,
the term major incident would be well
defined!
Who Should Get lnvolved?
To start, organizational leaders must
embrace the concept of a security
policy. Without leadership from the
top, the resources and commitment
necessary to implement the policy will
not follow. People won't adhere to the
guidelines set forth in the policy with-
out the clout ofyour organization's
leadership. Departmental leaders must
get involved because individual de-
partments have their individual tech-
nology requirements and their indi-
vidual security requirements. Students
and faculty must get involved because
they too have a stake in those security
decisions.
Lastly, we need the organization's
document to ensure that it is both
legal and consistent with the
institution's other policies. Once final,
our security policy must be distributed
to and understood by all levels of the
organization.
Rights and Responsibilities
For each group involved, we need to
specify rights and responsibilities. For
users, we need to specify account use
and software and data access. Users
must also know the rules about
passwords (not sharing them, not
writing them down, etc.). Users should
also know their rights, such as their
right to privacy, and under what
circumstances they will lose those
rights. They should also know which
individuals may revoke those rights.
For system managers or network
administrators, we must specifr
backup procedures, system configura-
tion guidelines, authentication
requirements, and auditing and
monitoring requirements. Someone
must be responsible for overseeing
users to make sure that they live up to
their responsibilities-and we must
also speci$, who will oversee the
overseers.
What Do We Put in Our Security Policy?
Our security policy must first inven-
tory our systems and assets. For each
asset, we need to discuss the four
phases of security: vulnerability,
prevention, detection, and recovery.
1. Vulnerability
Appropriate parties should discuss, in
detail, the vulnerabilities that pose
threats against each system. Knowing
the threats, we then need to determine
the methods to prevent intrusion.
Normally we try to protect ourselves in
the following areas:
. Authenticity: to ensure that
whoever accesses our systems is
who we think they are
. Privacy: to make sure that only
authorized individuals can access
confidential information
. Integrity: to make sure that the
information is not tampered with
or otherwise altered
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. Availability: to ensure that
authorized individuals can access
systems they need
For each threat, the security policy
will address the probable impact and
the maximum impact of each kind of
event.
As part of our vulnerability
assessment, we need to identifi, the
value of each asset and indicate what
the loss of that asset would represent
as well as how it would be replaced.
2. Prevention
Knowing the vulnerabilities, we can
then prescribe preventive measures.
We should give preference to technol-
ogy for preventive measures because
technology is consistent in how it will
deal with an issue. Then again, humans
always set up technology, so there is
that point of contention. We need to
prescribe measures to authenticate
users and systems. Notice that the
other three phases of security depend
on authenticity, so we must pay
particular attention to authenticating
our users. Passwords have become
almost trivial to crack or intercept, and
one day soon they'Il be outdated
altogether in favor of one of the
following:
. Securitytokens-synchronized,
ever-changing passwords through
password token devices
. Biometrics-authenticationbyuse
of some unique biological charac-
teristic like fingerprints, retina
scans etc.
. One-time passwords-passwords
used but one time and changed
after each log-in. This makes it
nearly impossible to guess pass-
words
As part of the prevention process,
we need to specifr acceptable use.
Much damage is done to systems
through inappropriate use. Without
specifring acceptable use, universities
invite unnecessary damage to their
computer systems. As implied earlier,
our policies must be adhered to and
enforced. Our policy must specify who
will audit adherence and what
penalties apply to each kind of
infraction. We must always make the
penalties proportionate to the
infraction. We must treat accidents
differently from malicious conduct,
and we must define terms such as
malicious and accident.
3. Detection
Network administrators often forget
that detection is just as important as
prevention. If someone is in the
process of attacking our systems, what
will we do? If we determine that
someone has already compromised
our systems, what will we do to limit
the damage? Once damage is miti-
gated, how do we prevent further
damage? How will we prevent future
attacks? None of these questions can
be answered, or even asked, without
detection methods. We should define
how we monitor our systems.
System logs are critical to detecting
security breaches. Logging of excep-
tional events will allow system
administrators to determine "normal"
patterns of use, so that when abnormal
patterns start, a security breach might
have occurred. The security policy
must specifr how detection is to be
accomplished, usually through logging
and alerts. Furthermore, the policy
must specifr who is responsible for
monitoring the logs and the alerts.
Lastly, we should add fail-safes to
ensure that those responsible are
monitored as well.
4. Recovery
We must be prepared for times of
crisis. Our security policy dictates how
we handle these crises. First of all,
whom should we notifr and by what
means? Have we documented impor-
tant personnel's home and mobile
phone numbers?
Some of the questions we must ask
ourselves include the following:
. Do we let an event continue in
order to catch the culprit?
. Have we secured the log files to
preserve an audit trail ofwhat
happened? Better yet, do we ensure
that an attacker cannot destroy log
files?
' Do we shut down some critical
services to prevent further dam-
ages?
' Do we contact legal authorities?
. What type of backups must be
maintained to ensure a full (or at
least acceptable) recovery? Better
yet, have we tested our recovery
procedures to ensure acceptable
recovery?
Answering these questions is part
of the process that the security policy
takes us down. Having prepared the
answers avoids precipitous, if not
inappropriate, action during the time
of a crisis.
Once we recover from an incident,
we need to use the information
gathered in the recovery and detection
phase to improve our understanding
of the vulnerability phase. As part of
this feedback loop, we need to ask if
the policy was followed and how the
policy can be changed to prevent
similar events in the future.
What Are the Special Challenges Facing
Academic lnstitutions?
Academic institutions face special
challenges not faced by commercial or
government entities, including:
. They comprise many autonomous
entities that have complex trust
relationships with each other.
. They have difficulty in controlling
end users.
' The culture cultivates free thinking
and "open" access to information.
. They have a network anarchy-that
is, just about anyone can attach to
the network at any time. Further-
more, students have little organized
supervision to control inappropri-
ate behavior.
. The university serves as a research
body, corporation, and Internet
service provider. Colleges and
universities must analyze each of
these functions to determine the
proper stance to take with regard to
security.
Resources on the Web
http:/ /www.brown.eilu/Research/tlnix *Admin/ cuisp / : A compilation of
computer policies from institutions of higher education-a
"must" resource for colleges and universities.
http :/ /www. sans. org/newlo okl resources/ p olicie s/ p olic ies.htm: fr om the
System Administration, Networking and Security Institute-
probably the best resource for security policies. Provides
dozens of resources and links to sites that instruct on how to
write an effective security policy.
http :/ /www. cis.ohio - state.edu/ cgi-bin/ rfc/ rfc2 1 96.html: An official
Internet request for comment, a guide to developing computer
security policies and procedures for sites connected to the
Internet.
http: / / secinf.net/info / policy/nets ec l.htm: How to develop a network
security policy.
http://secinf.net/info/policy/AusCERT.html: Site security policy
development-outlines issues one should consiiler when
writing a security policy.
h t t p : / / d o w nlo ad s. s e cur ity fo cu s. c o m/lib rary /Why 
-S ecur it y -P o li c ie s *
Fail.pdf: A white paper from Control Data Corporation, "Why
Security Policies Fail," or better named, the characteristics of
successful security policies.
On top of all that, most universities and enforceable. It lists our informa-
have pretty rigid security require- tion assets through four phases of the
ments. Answering the questions security process: vulnerability,
involved in developing a sound prevention, detection, and recovery. It
security policy that balances security protects oul assets in the areas of
with cost, capability, and convenience authenticity, privacy, integrity' and
is easier in less complex organizationr. availability'
Conclusion Ted Udelson, president of lntegrity Computing,
can be reached at TedU@ lntegrityComputing.
The security policy is both a journeY com. lntegrity Computing, lnc., is a technology
and a destination, and this journey firm that provides technology strategic
leads to the destination of more secure planning, needs assessments, network
systems. The security policy process consulting, and security.
involves everyone, especially top
management, and all levels of the lll
organization. It must be adhered to
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Technology Services (IAT
Services) has imple-
mented both firewall and
virtual private network-
ing (VPN) services to
help protect the campus
network, its systems, and
the data stored within.
Firewalls
First, a little about why
firewalls are needed,
exactly what they do, and
how IAT Services
manages this technology
at MU.
Almost every mid-
to large-size business or
organization uses a local
area network (LAN) to
effectively share re-
sources and communi-
cate with others on its local network.
Many of these LANs have a connection
to the Internet, extending these
benefits outside the local network and
around the world. Unfortunately, this
Mizzou lntegrates Firewall and VPN
Technology for Added Security
The commodity Internet has changed
how many college and university
departments conduct research, interact
with students and other affiliates, and
share information both internally and
around the world. With new laws and
regulations being passed (i.e., the
Children's Internet Protection Act and
the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act) and with height-
ened security requirements for
e-business and credit card transactions,
schools must take the proper measures
to ensure compliance and protection.
At the University of Missouri-
Columbia (MU), the department of
Information and Access
connection to the Internet presents an
exponentially increased security risk.
Internet connections allow both
inbound and outbound traffic; on the
plus side, LAN users can access an
abundance of information and
resources outside their local network.
The associated risk, of course, is that
they simultaneously open up their
network to incoming Internet traffic.
Sometimes this incoming Internet
traffic is desirable, as is the case when
providing services across the Internet.
Other times, Internet traffic takes the
undesirable form of hackers who are
looking to compromise the LAN as
well as the systems and data resources
contained within. Firewalls can help
protect against these actions.
A firewall is a network device that
serves as a checkpoint between
multiple networks. It is configured
with specific rules specif,ing exactly
what can and cannot be passed
between the networks. These rules can
be based on IP subnets, specific IP
addresses, MAC addresses, and TCP/IP
ports among others. A firewall
examines the traffic being passed from
one network to another and routes (or
denies) the traffic accordingly. The
typical firewall design includes a
minimum of two security zones. One
is very secure, restricting most, if not
all, access from the outside networks.
Others are less restrictive than the first
but still maintain a base level of
security. Firewall administrators tend
to place servers containing nonpublic
or sensitive data, such as credit card
information, medical records, or
research, in the secure zone while
providing baseline protection for staff
workstations in the less restrictive
security zones.
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There are two methodologies used
to deploy firewalls at MU. The first is
to strategically place them on the
enterprise network to help protect MU
from the outside world. Currently
there are two firewalls on the enter-
prise network: one in front of the
departmental network and another in
front of the residential student
network. These firewalls are used to
apply general security rules based on
preapproved policies that are appropri-
ate for each of these networks. Since
the restrictions applied to these
firewalls are general in nature, another
level of firewall security may be
needed.
This second level of firewall
protection is positioned on individual
building or departmental networks.
Because many MU departments have
unique netr,vork security requirements,
these firewall restrictions are custom-
ized per the departmental needs,
offering multiple zones of varying
security levels.
Beyond the obvious security need,
there were other reasons for IAI
Services to offer a centralized firewall
service to departments. Before the
departmental firewall service was
offered, a handful of departments had
bought and were self-maintaining their
own firewalls. Since these departments
didn't purchase the same firewall
product, different knowledge bases
were required to manage each firewall
device. Many of these departments had
only one or two technology experts, so
there was a risk involved with the
depth of support, and there were
inefficiencies since firewall manage-
ment was not the primary responsibil-
ity for these individuals. Seeing this
trend, IAT Services adopted the Cisco
Secure PIX 500 Firewall Series as the
campus standard, based on its feature
set and scaleability, and leveraged the
preestablished network security group
to specialize on, manage, and support
this product line. This decision
increased the efficiency involved with
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Figure 1: MU Network lnfrastructure: Firewalls and VPN
firewall management and enabled IAT
Services to provide a cost-effective
service. Departments pay the purchase
price of the firewall box, an initial
setup fee, and monthly maintenance.
The maintenance cost includes the
manufacturer's maintenance and
routine maintenance tasks performed
by IAT Services, like code upgrades
and maintaining backup copies of
device confi gurations. Additionally,
IAT Services maintains a baseline level
of spare firewall equipment should a
box fail and need immediate replace-
ment. Subsequent firewall configura-
tion changes and/or in-depth consult-
ing services are billed on a time-and-
materials basis.
Virtual Private Networking (VPN)
VPN technology offers several benefits
revolving around a variety of remote
access services, network and data
security through authentication and
encryption, and potential cost savings.
At MU, VPN is used in conjunction
with firewalls to enhance the overall
security of the campus network
infrastructure. VPN serves as a
method for legitimate users to access
MU-specific applications and re-
sources by allowing access around
firewall-imposed restrictions that may
be in place to block outside Internet
:::"r'.tt :'"toers 
(IsPs) and untrusted
There are four varieties ofVPN
services being implemented at MU:
general, group, and LAN-to-LAN
access, and direct VPN access to a
departmental firewall.
The general access VPN service
offering is a no-charge service
designed for all MU faculty, staff, and
students needing to access specific
resources that are restricted at the
enterprise firewalls. This service
provides an encrypted tunnel to the
campus network via an outside ISP
connection at the end user's point of
origin. Since accessing campus
resources is the sole purpose of this
service and the users already have an
ISR access from campus to the Internet
is restricted to save on bandwidth
consumption and to limit the VPN
connection times, effectively freeing up
resources for others to use.
The group access VPN service is
similar in structure to that of the
general access service; however, it's
geared toward departmental users who
need guaranteed access and the same
IP address each time they connect.
This service is ideal for system
administrators to securely manage
their systems from a remote location.
There is a monthly charge associated
with this service since address space
and VPN resources are allocated to a
specific department.
The LAN-Io-LAN service offering
is hardware based, whereas the general
and group services establish connec-
tions via client software. With a LAN-
to-LAN connection, remote sites can
establish a VPN connection through a
VPN concentrator for their entire site,
eliminating the need for each worksta-
tion to have a client running. This
service is very cost effective for
connecting remote sites because a
dedicated WAN connection such as Tl
or frame relay can potentially be
eliminated. Instead, remote sites can
purchase local ISP connections and
use VPN to secure their communica-
tions with MU. A monthly charge is
associated with the hardware mainte-
nance and VPN connection since the
service requires the allocation of
specific VPN resources.
Finally, the departmental firewalls
that are used at MU are capable of
serving VPN connections to the
specific network they protect. This
VPN service is offered on a case-by-
case basis and is configured at the time
of the initial firewall implementation.
Unless the department has a specific
security concern whereby it needs
remote connections encrypted across
the campus network in addition to the
Internet, departments are encouraged
to use the general or group access VPN
service. Departments are charged on a
time-and-materials basis for IAT
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Services to administer VPN on a
departmental firewall.
Like many schools, MU provides
remote access to its network in the
form of dial-up modem pools, which
can be expensive to maintain. With
ISPs offering more competitive rates
for high-speed broadband services
such as DSL and cable, VPN may in
some cases eliminate the need for
colleges and universities to provide
remote access in the form of dial-up
and leased-line connectivity.
The combination of firewall and
VPN services can help eliminate
trade-offs associated with implement-
ing one service or the other. Firewalls
can restrict all outside access to a
system or its resources, allowing only
authorized VPN connections if
desired. VPNs can effectively extend a
network wherever its users are located,
be it in their homes, in their travels, or
on sabbatical, offering security in the
form of encryption back to the
campus network. Additionally, by
centrally managing these services,
schools can take advantage of cost
savings received from promoting
internal efficiency.
Firewalls and VPN technologies are
no guarantee that the network is
completely secure-the SANS security
forum identifies over-reliance on
firewalls as part of the problem in their
list of top l0 security mistakes
businesses make-but they are
valuable pieces of a security plan. It's a
good idea to continually reevaluate the
security requirements for a network,
modifi,ing the firewall and VPN rules
along the way.
Nathan Eatherton is a business technology
analyst at University of Missouri-Columbia.
Contact him at eathertonn@missouri.edu.
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From music schools to
software labs, colleges
lead security
endeavors
by Curt Harler
Contributing Editor
College-Based Programs Boost
Computer Security
Universities are on the cutting edge of
innovation in many fields, including
computer security. While colleges are
frequently-and justifi ably-slammed
both as being the source of and the
incubators for distribution of computer
worms and viruses, the fact is that
colleges are among the leaders in
protecting comPuter networks.
Safe computing is usuallY consid-
ered an individual responsibility: If you
don't look out for your own network's
health and safety, you deserve whatever
bugs infect your system. However,
many programs are available to help
network administrators practice safe
computing.
CERT, the Computer Emergency Besponse
Team
The best-known and most active
university-based security project is the
CERT Coordination Center (CERT/
CC). CERT, the Computer EmergencY
Response Team, is a center of Internet
security expertise located at the
Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a
federally funded research and develop-
ment center operated by Carnegie
Mellon University in Pittsburgh.
CERT provides a reliable, trusted,
single point of contact for Internet-
related emergencies 2417.In just the
first quarter of 2002 a whopping 26,829
incidents were recorded by CERT.
That's up from six incidents in 1988
and 132 in all of 1989. In fact, this
year's fanuary-March total represents
about one-fifth of all the incidents
(127,198) ever reported since the group
began record keeping in 1988.
An incident may involve one site,
hundreds, or even thousands of sites.
Some incidents involve ongoing activity
over long periods of time. Do these
statistics mean that hackers are
becoming more obnoxious or that
CERT is getting better at tracking
incidents? History says it may be both.
Following the Morris worm
incident, which brought 10 percent of
Internet systems to a halt in November
1988, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency charged SEI with
setting up a center to coordinate
communication among experts during
security emergencies and to help
prevent future incidents. Since then, the
CERT/CC has helped to establish other
response teams. CERT's incident-
handling practices have been adopted
by more than 90 response teams
around the world.
CERT lists what it calls "security
practices." These are concrete, practical
tips and guidance to help colleges and
other organizations improve the security
of networked computer systems. These
practices address the most pervasive
problems, as reported to the CERT/CC.
They are technology-neutral for broad
application. A complete list of the
practices can be found on the CERT/CC
Web site at http://www.cert.org/security-
improvement/. Every network adminis-
trator should have that site
hookmarked.
CERT/CC also has books available
on security. Some of the CERT staff
members teach courses in the Informa-
tion Security Management specializa-
tion ol the Master of lnformation
Systems Management program in the
H. J. Heinz III School of Public Policy
and Management at Carnegie Mellon.
CERT's Forum of Incident Re-
sponse and Security Teams (FIRST) is a
coalition of individual response teams
around the world. Each response team
builds trust within its constituent
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community by establishing contacts and working relation-
ships with members of that community. These relation-
ships enable response teams to be sensitive to the distinct
needs, technologies, and policies of their constituents.
FIRST members collaborate on incidents that cross
boundaries, and they cross-post alerts and advisories on
proLrlems relevant to their constituents.
Toward Secure Software: CSDS
The Idaho State Board of Education established irs Center
for Secure and Dependable Software (CSDS) at the
University of Idaho in response to the overwhelming need
for computer-related security education and research. Dr.
Liz Wilhite, program manager at the center, says the
program's vision is to become a leader in the field of
computer forensics.
"In five years, we will have our own program, with
majors at all levels (undergrad, masters, and doctoral) in
computer forensics," Wilhite says. That's an aggressive
schedule for a program just three years old.
In May 1999, the National Security Agency (NSA)
designated the University of Idaho as one of the initial
seven Centers of Excellence in Information Assurance
Education, partly in recognition of CSDS's efforts in
promoting information security education and research.
Where CERT focuses on response to computer
incidents, CSDS looks at designing software to prevent
incidents in the first place.
CSDS is made up of 10 computer science faculty, three
business faculty, two accounting, one law faculty, associates
in the College of Education at INEEL and PNNL, a full-
time program manager) over 30 students, and 3,000 square
feet of laboratory and office space, Wilhite says. The
program is adding a computer engineer, as well.'A well-
rounded staff is necessary to do our job," Wilhite says.
INEEL is the Idaho National Engineering and Environ-
mental Lab, a multipurpose national laboratory delivering
science and engineering solutions to the world's environ-
mental, energy, and security challenges. PNNL is the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, Richmond, Washington
(www.pnl.gov).
Completely self-funded, CSDS brings together
collaborative research efforts and serves as an educational
focal point for the design, development, analysis, and use
of technologies that result in secure and dependable
computing systems.
The program involves both students and faculty, often
working together on research with commercial impact. In
addition, they work with Idaho State as part of the
National Alliance for Information Assurance, with Idaho
State focusing on the business and human side of the
equation.
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When the young lady came into the
lobby at CBL Data Recovery
Technologies (www.cbltech.com,
Toronto, Canada), she was distraught.
She had her whole thesis on a floppy
disk. She left school, stuck the disk in
her back pocket, sat down, and drove
her car three hours home to Toronto.
When she got home-surprise!-the
disk was bent.
There was no reason to lecture her
about backups, recalls CBLs Dan
Pelosi. It was too late; she had none. A
team of sympathetic techs worked on
Sad Story, Happy Ending
the disk but to no avail. "Things didn't
look good," he recalls. The poor girl
just sat down on the lobby floor and
cried great heaving sobs. Nine months
of work was lost.
"We all felt so bad. The techs
agreed to try again," Pelosi says. After
several more hours'work, they were
able to access enough of the disk to
print out a hard copy of three-fourths
of the data. The student was ecstatic.
"She was so happy she called us every
day for two weeks to thank us," he
recal1s.
"In five years, look to the University
of Idaho for leadership in the computer
forensics fi eld." Wilhite promises.
Georgia Tech Does lt Right
While assisting and training profes-
sionals is a huge undertaking, there is a
real need to get the information
distributed here and now to the
everyday user. Georgia Tech has a page
that other schools could emulate. At
www.security.gatech.edu, faculty,
students, and staff are given a handle
on safe, secure computer operation.
They also can check out a range of
For students, who typically are
broke, CBLs standard fee is $250 plus a
college T-shirt that hangs on their
"wall of friends." For a typical desktop
recovery, the fee is $500 to $2,600. For
servers, with larger disks and advanced
operating systems, the cost can go to
$6,000. There is no charge if no data is
recovered.
Turnaround time generally is four
days, including one day's shipping each
way. CBL has locations in San Diego
and Armonk, New York, too.
"Lots of people just don't back up,"
Pelosi says. He adds that IS/IT
departments should invest a few hours'
time in a review of its contingency,
disaster, and recovery plans. "It'11 save
thousands of hours later on," he
promises.
Physical damage (fire, floods, back
pockets) represents about 60 percent
of recovery scenarios. Dropped Think
Pads and kicked I-Books are
commonplace. The other 40 percent of
data loss is due to viruses and other
logical disasters.
"Universities, especially, need to
have their antivirus programs up to
date. Every week something new
comes out that can bring down four or
five servers," he says.
computer threats from viruses to
computer-aided identity theft threats.
Passwords, firewalls, encryption, and
other practices are outlined.
What is nice about the Georgia Tech
site-and refreshingly different and
vastly more helpful than many
university sites that offer only generic
recommendations-is that the site
names brand names and actually site
licenses products for the Georgia Tech
community. It also does not hesitate to
note when a product still has bugs to be
worked out, as it did this past spring
Dan Pelosi says his standard fee for data recovery for students is $250 plus a
college T-shirt that hangs on their "wall of friends."
Idaho got off to a flying start when
University President Bob Houser served
on a board formed by former U.S.
President Bill Clinton. The state's
representatives and senators were quick
to hop on the bandwagon.
Part of the program's outreach
includes workshops like one in August,
sponsored by NSA. The University of
Idaho also gets support for such
programs from the Department of
Defense and the Inland Northwest
Research Association.
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when reviewing a firewall product that
interfered with Netscape (the vendor
now says the product has been fixed).
Tech's Web site is for "family
members" of the Georgia Tech
community only. However, it does not
stop anyvisitor from noodling around
the Web site and getting an idea of how
the school's network usage policies are
outlined, looking at its security
awareness policy, or checking out
several other useful features.
lnfo Security lnstitute
As they do in Idaho, the Johns Hopkins
University I nformation Securi ty
Institute (ISI) takes a comprehensive
approach to information security.
Located in Baltimore, Maryland, ISI
is an information security partnership
across the divisions of Johns Hopkins
that addresses all of information
security's major concerns. "The idea is
to take a holistic perspective on
information security. We don't want to
duplicate programs like CERT's, says
ISI Founding Director Dr. Gerald
Masson. "They do what they do
exceedingly weil. Our goal is to take
students with an information technol-
ogy background and develop their
technology, policy, management, and
applications components."
An anonymous donor gave $10
million to establish ISI. ISI blends
educational, research, business
relationship components, and a
mixture of academic, business, and
government involvement.
ISI will combine concerns from its
school of advanced international
studies, public health, and even the
Peabody Music Conservatory (which
will deal with intellectual property
rights and MP3 types of issues) and the
civilian bio-terrorism defense strategy
group. ISI outlines its goals as follows:
1. To create an interdisciplinary and
cross-divisional environment for
research and study of issues related to
information security, including
technology, privacy, strategic manage-
ment, and a number of other emerging
fields.
2. To establish effective feedback loops
with organizations outside of academia
to sharpen research and education and
to create new opportunities for
programs and projects.
3. To establish JHU's eminence in the
fieid in the eyes ofboth researchers and
practitioners by developing programs
of the highest quality.
ISI will confer a master's degree in
security informatics starting this fall
(2002). Eventually, an undergraduate
minor will be added to the program.
\Ahile it will not track viruses and
physical disasters, the program looks at
other relevant issues. "While technol-
ogy is at the core of the whole informa-
tion security field," Masson says, "there
are ot her relevant issues-privacy,
copyright, digital rights, and other
regulations that are equally significant.
This degree touches every component
and division of the university," Masson
says.
A six-page introductory white
paper on ISI is available at
www.jhuisi.jhu.edu/About/IHUISI
DescriptionPaper-O60 1 0 l.pdf.
New Jersey's New Program
The newly formed Center for Wireless
Networking and Internet Security,
based at the New Jersey Institute of
Technology (NIIT), Newark, in
collaboration with Princeton Univer-
sity, is a new think tank designed to
develop technologies that can identiS,
and block hacker intrusions.
NfIT claims to be "America's most
wired public university." The joint
program hopes to develop technologies
to protect the Internet from cyber
attacks. It will also work on protecting
and improving computer network
management.
The center, funded by a $2.6 million
grant from the New lersey Commission
on Science and Technology, will
complement two others already at
NJIT: the Center for Communications
and Signal Processing, run by Yeheskel
Barness, NfIT distinguished professor
of electrical engineering, and the New
f ersey Center for Telecommunications,
run by Alexander Haimovich, NJIT
associate professor of electrical
engineering.
Atam Dhawan, Ph.D., the center's
director, is a professor of electrical and
computer engineering at NfIT. He
oversees the operation of the center,
working with a team of researchers
from NJIT and Princeton. Those
researchers are allied with a host of
corporate technology leaders from
firms such as AT&T, Mitsubishi, NEC,
and Spirent Communications. A
representative from the U.S. Army is also
on the advisory board as is an employee
lrom the New fersey Commission on
Science and Technology.
Students at both NIIT and Princ-
eton benefit from the center's guiding
research proiects in accordance with
industry need. About 20 doctoral
candidates from both schools will work
on solving problems such as how to
make wireless networks more secure.
The research will train the students to
work for high-tech firms after they
graduate.
"The center will forge a synergistic
relationship between academia and
industryi' says Dhawan. "The universi-
ties are key to knowledge dissemina-
tion, and the center will allow academ-
ics to develop technology they under-
stand best, such as protecting the
Internet from hackers and transferring
that technology to industry. That will
in turn create jobs and have a signifi-
cant economic impact on the state."
Based at the Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering building at NJIT, the
center already has two computer labs,
and more computers and equipment
are to come, Dhawan says. He expects
the center will receive additional
funding from both corporations and
the federal government.
Researchers use grant funds to work
on myriad technologies. One planned
technology will allow the military to
instantly recognize a cyber attack and
trace its source. The center will also
design computer systems that can
predict, and thus prevent, a cyber
attack, especially attacks on wireless
multimedia networks. Researchers will
also upgrade network management
security. Wireless systems are especially
vulnerable since hackers can exploit
their very nature: providing location-
aware services and location-sensitive
modes of access to information services.
Wireless networks must deal with
unauthorized detection and tracking of
location users. The center also will
work to safeguard the Internet from
consumer fraud.
"The Internet was first conceived to
be an information highway with access
to all," says Dhawan. "Because of that,
we now have few standards to protect
information. Classifi ed information
about healthcare, banking, e-com-
merce, online shopping, our personal
lives, and our military safety can all be
in jeopardy. There's no better environ-
ment than the academic one to work in
and solve these problems, and that's
what the Center for Wireless Network-
ing and Internet Security will do."
Critical lnfrastructure Protection Proiect
(crP)
One of the newest programs is the
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Project (CIP), a collaborative effort led
by George Mason University School of
Law's National Center for Technology
and Law in Arlington, Virginia, in
conjunction with Iames Madison
University. CIP got rolling in mid-May
this year. CIP is funded by a $6.5
million National Institute of Standards
and Technology gralt.
"Our intent is for the CIP Project to
generate real solutions that address the
complex legal, policy, and technology
issues associated with an increasing
number of cyber attacks and cyber
failures affecting government agencies,
military, private-sector businesses, and
even individuals," says fohn McCarthy,
executive director of CIP.
"By working together, George
Mason University and |ames Madison
University will develop a nationally
recognized program that fully inte-
grates the disciplines of law, policy, and
technology for enhancing the security
of cyber nefi,vorks and economic
processes supporting the nation's
critical infrastructures," McCarthy says.
"The consideration of all three
disciplines is what will make the CIP
Project unique and valuable."
Among the hurdles CIP faces are
impediments involving intricate
questions of law, policy, and business
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processes and their relationship to
technological applications. Some
examples include tort liability, informa-
tion sharing among competitors for
security purposes, and exchange of
information betu,een business and
governmcnt to improvc cooperation
for managing national security risks.
The CIP Project's four program
elernents includc thc lollowing:
' Providing education and outreach 
-
seminars and workshops, professional
education and trair-ring, and facilitated
governmen t- industrv- academic
discussions.
. Serving as a repository of expertise
tbr government and industrv 
- 
Because
cyber-security issues are not generally
well understood, there is a need for
expertise in a range of issue areas.
Government support includes develop-
ing model legislation covering cvber-
security issues and testifliing on
complex issues ol law, polic1., and
techr.rologv.
' Sponsoring research 
- 
While there
is lro single source of excellence in
cyber-securitv larv and policy, both
George l\{ason University and James
Madison University are recognized bv
the National Security Agency as
Centers of Excellence for Cyber
Security. CIP rvill develop a one-stop
shop for ir.rformation on cyber security
lar'v and policy and support applied
research as well as long-term endeavors
in 1aw, po1ic1,, and technology.
' Developing special programs 
- 
by
focusing resources on certain special
areas of interest, such as guidance to
smail business, directing cvber-security
knowiedge and expertise directly into
the homcland security discussion.
integrating technological expertise n,ith
lega1 and policy insights to support
creation olI viable underwritirrg
market for cyber risks, and information
sharing and analvsis center modeling.
Down the Boad
The job of keeping net\\,orks secure is
not getting easier. McCarthy notes that
senior leaders in business, government,
and academia are struggling'r.r,,ith a
variety of technological and nontech-
nological irnpedirnents to manrging
cyber-related risks.
"Clearly, September 1 t has changed
the game. There is a nationtrl and
international concern relative to the use
and exchange of information on the
Internet. Universities of the stature of
Johns Hopkirrs and others feel an
obligation to address this area,"
concludes Masson.
Curt Harler is a contributing editor for the
ACUTA Journal. He can be reached at
curtharler@adelphia.net.
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byTracy Mitrano
Cornell University
Privacy on Today's Electronic Campus
New technology generates new anxieties-
often with good reason. The trade-offs of
one generation are not always the same for
another generation with different historical
circumstances or different expectations of
efficiency, privacy, and social order. The
popularization of the transportation and
communications industries-from trains
to planes and telegraphs to telephones-
produced a long litany of contract and tort
cases, not to mention reams of regulations
and volumes of administrative law.
In light of the remarkable technologies
that have made electronic communications
a popular and significant comPonent of
the American economy, it is no wonder
that electronic communications have
raised a wide range of new questions and
concerns about Internet service provider
liability, Internet governance, legal
strictures for government surveillance, and
privacy in general. Perhaps the main
reason is that people feel so personal about
their computer usage.
The psychological intimacy between
people and their computers sharply
contrasts with the fact that network
operators can see electronic communica-
tions, governments with proper authoriza-
tion can intercept transmissions or obtain
stored data, and snoops or hackers can all
too easily sniffcommunications or trespass
into an individual's computer. For those
who have used electronic data or commu-
nications to express personal emotions or
political thoughts, it is a shock to learn that
their message has been posted on the Web
or widely circulated as the result of easy
forwarding. Electronic diaries and wills
have been sent out as documents as the
result of a computer virus. The sniffing out
of a credit card or social security number
produces obvious credit problems.
Harassing or defamatory messages put on
the Web for the entire world to see can be a
psychic blow that leads to questions of
trust and privacy and strikes the mystic
cords that bind people to their society.
Technology
So what are the rules-technical, legal, and
ethical-that shape this very uncertain
reality of the privacy of electronic commu-
nications? Technically, people should be
prepared to accept that network operators
can see virtually any unencrypted commu-
nication. In cases where the operators are
performing necessary business functions,
they do, in fact, sometimes see such
communications. Notwithstanding the
common analogy that an e-mail is like a
postcard going through the United States
Postal Service, the more accurate compari-
son would be telephone operators or
technicians who could break into live
communications in the course of their
duties.
One distinction to make between both
of these analogies and electronic commu-
nication is that in neither the postal nor
telephonic world are backups or network
logs maintained that provide yet another
avenue lor retrieval of communications
and/or data after the fact. People are often
surprised to learn that their own comput-
ers contain records of every Web site
visited. The capacity and volume of
information that network communications
contain constitute a quantum leap of trace
and tracking ability that understandably
makes people nervous. And even if it could
be established that no social or political
entity conspired to make this technology so
transparent, it simply feels unnerving to
discover that the privacy of communica-
tions is not what it used to be.
Law
Two federal criminal laws speak directly to
the Iegal and ethical concerns regarding
electronic privacy. First, the Computer
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Abuse Act, Title 1B of the criminal code, section 1030
specifically, renders computer trespass-not just rattling
the doorknobs but actual penetration, retrieval, or
damage-and destructive programs such as worms and
viruses illegal. Second, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) establishes privacy of electronic
communications at a standard similar to the wiretapping
act of the late 1 960s. In short, the disclosure of any
information by an Internet service provider to the public
is actionable. Since Congress amended ECPA in 1994 to
include lvireiess communications, sniffing is uncharted
Iegal territory, given that the spectrum in which wireless
communications operate is public.l
Almost certainly reading the text of a communication
would support at least a cause of action, especially if that
communication r,vas disclosed to the public. Disclosure is
regulated even for those who fall under some of the
exceptions to ECPA, such as network operators who
access communications in the normal course of business
or law enforcement with an administrative, executive, or
court order to access transmissions and data. If a network
operator working in the usual course of business uncovers
the extramarital affair of a famous person, for example, it
is against the law to disclose it. Likewise, if in the course
of an investigation, 1aw enforcement discovers legal but
potentially damaging information about an individual, say
the homosexuality of a closeted person (in a state with no
sodomy iaws), it may not disclose that information. The
singular exception to the exception is when consent is
given by one party to a communication to disclose
information of the second party; such disclosure is not
actionable.
State tort laws offer another dimension to this issue.
Claims such as defamation, misappropriation of like-
nesses, or invasion of privacy-together with state sexual
harassment laws-offer opportunities for ambitious
attorneys to carve out a specialized niche in tort and civil
plaintiff Internet 1aw. Actions in this area are still very
sparse and have yet to yield a clear direction of the law
and so remain speculative at best. Such speculation leads
to another question, however: What about the ethical
dimensions of exposure on the World Wide Web? I have a
personal example.
I was teaching my 10-year-o1d son horv to do a search
when he suggested that we search my name. To my
surprise there appeared as a title, "The shit hits the fan ..."
In my role as copyright agent for the university under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, I had sent a
student a form notice of copyright infringement. He had
sent it on to a friend at another university who posted the
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The capacity and volume of information that network
communications contain constitute a quantum leap of
trace and tracking ability that understandably makes
people nervous.
notice on the Web with that opening phrase. Since the
recipient consented to the posting, I have no cause of
action in criminal law, and since it does not allege
anything defamatory about me, I have no private claim
either. (It most certainly would have been a violation of
the Buckley Amendment, or the Family Education Records
Privacy Act, for me as an agent of the university, to post
the information.) But still, it is a gratuitous posting. I
acted as an en-rployee of the ur-riversity, yet the search
turned into something personal about me.
I decided to contact the student, not as an employee of
the university but as a private individual on my home
computer and lvith my private e-mail address. I asked him
to redact my name and the name of another employee. He
never did. Given the minor significance of this incident, I
present it as an example of an ethical question. In lieu of
law, how do we, as citizens of the United States and of the
world of Internet users, articulate an ethics of electronic
media?
Cornell University Policy
Where law treads, policy is sure to follow. Larv-from
Middle English, "to 1ay dor.vn"-represents the floor of
acceptable behavior, a level of performance beneath which
an individual or institution courts liability. Policy-from
the ancient Greek, "polis" or "citizen"-speaks to higher
principles that incorporate foundational social and
political notions of rights and responsibilities of the
individual to the group, and ofthe group to and for the
individual. To be sure, policy does not fill the gap between
the larv and ethics completel,v. To drarv upon the example
explored above, it is important to note that not even
policy lvould have addressed my concerns. The fan
material is not posted on the Cornell University network,
but even if it were, the university does not have a policy
against posting it. To the contrary, the university's Policy
on Responsible Use of Electronic Comn-runications holds
forth on free speech that does not violate 1aw or policy in
such a way that it rvould have been a violation of policy for
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me) as an officer of the university, to use my authority to
remove itl
Such strictures define the obligations that the univer-
sity undertakes to protect its constituents. Conversely,
intervening in cases where individual students interlere
with the activity of others and establishing ground rules of
responsible use and security are obligations the university
exercises to maintain order and to teach responsible use.
Such intervention prohibits bandwidth hogging, e-mail
bombing, and sharing passwords. To adhere to those rules
is the obligation of individuals who enjoy the privilege of
network usage. Those rules are not codified in American
1aw but they could potentiaily bring sanction upon
constituents of the university who use the network in
violation of them, u.hich illuminates precisely how policy
raises expectations of an individual's behavior. The policy
reasons why those rules exist: to promote fairness, respect,
and dignity-if not a relative concept of privacy-
comport with the lolty mission of the university.
A note on the term privacyis lr,orth making at this
.iuncture. The concept of privacy in American law is largely
a 20th-century phenomenor-r and has come to revolve
around the debate over abortion or reproductive rights as
they took shape in the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
However rnuch ridiculed, lustice Goldberg's famous
statement that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution amount to a "penum-
bra" of privacy rights, otherwise not articulated as such by
name in that august document, represent to date the best
sumn-rary ol how American constitutional law considers
this nebulous area. It is equally important to remember
that the Constitution protects against government action
and not private entities. Thus, while privacy may have
become the catchword for personal rights in the last half
of the 20th century, those rights do not translate to all
areas of experience and certainly not to private entities
such as Cornell Universitv.
Policies on Privacy
The University Counsel's Office has made it clear to policy
advisors across campus that their policies had best steer
clear ofthe term privacy, lest it suggest or infer a set of
rights to which the university is not obliged, and to which
the university would not want to associate itself in policy
as a matter of potential litigation. Nuanced terms such as
fair intbrmation practices fill the gap that privacy policies
might well play in state universities or other governmental
institutions.
Another example of how the public and private
distinction plays out is in the area of privacy rights for
employees of any private network. Employees enjoy no
privacy whatsoever. Every case that has asked questions
about monitoring, snooping, sniffing, and consciously and
intentionally looking at either transmissions or stored data
of employees has found squarely for the employer, not the
employee.
To its credit, Cornell, while reserving its right to
monitor communications, has nonetheless stated in policy
that it will not adopt those practices as a matrer of normal
business. The University Policy on Responsible Use states
that while it reserves the right to control and access
systems, it does not as a practice monitor data or usage.
Important distinctions must be made among three
discrete points. Technologically, systems operators can see,
for example, e-mail or URLs passing through as transmis-
sions. Yet, the equally true fact that more than 1 million
e-mail messages pass through the Cornell network on
average every day means that it is impossible to monitor
them, even if the university did not hold itself to a higher
ethical standard in policy. Thus, there is a difference
between the technological ability to see e-mail and the
practice of reading it. It is important to note, however, that
as a matter of policy, in the course of standard business
procedures, should system operators observe content of
e-mail, they are obliged to maintain the confidentiality of
it unless the content ofwhat they observe violates law or
policy or is evidence of immediate danger of life and limb,
in which case they are obliged to report it.
Another variation on the theme of privacy of an
individual's data on an electronic network is the question
of how third parties can gain access to it. The Office of
Information Technologies is sponsoring a policy on this
matter, called Fair Information Practices for the Access of
Data about Individuals Transmitted or Stored on Cornell
Information Technologies Systems. Until such time as the
university policy office issues it, it is the practice of the
Office of Information Technologies and Cornell Informa-
tion Technologies to provide information to third parries
only on the request of the head of the subject's constitu-
ency (i.e., the vice presidents of Human Resources, or
Student Affairs or the dean of faculty) or to law enforce-
ment with proper authorization. Individuals may retrieve
Iogging information about themselves if they present
reasonable cause in a formal request to the policy advisor
of Information Technologies. And then there is the
question of sniffing. It may be murky in the law, but it is
clear in policy. Cornell Information Technology interprets
the Cornell University Policy Regarding Abuse of Comput-
ers and Network Systems to make "sniffing" a violation.2
And there are other matters too, such as the selling of e-
mail addresses or the use of cookies for the collection of
personal information about users-neither of which is a
practice of Cornell Information Technologies, nor, in my
humble opinion, should they ever be.3
Conclusion
Each generation will define privacy in the electronic world
by setting the concept beside an array of external realities
such as prevailing custom and law, technologies and
practices, institutional policies, and ethical ideals. The
tensions between the dual human impulses to preserve a
personal environment and to accommodate the demands
of society for survival inform that effort. Indeed, the
electronic world will not change that dynamic, but will
add to its many dimensions. We could choose to ignore
the debate, but only with the most contemporary notions
of privacy as this generation knows them hanging in the
balance. Awareness, political discourse, and policy
discussion will not eliminate the tension but animate it
with creativity.
Tracy Mitrano is policy advisor and director ol computer policy and law,
Office ol lnlormation Technologies at Cornell University. Beach her at
tbm3@cornell.edu.
Notes
t 
"Sniffing" is a slang term for interception of data communications.
In telephonic communications the analogous term is "tapping."
2 http ://www.cit.cornell.edu/computer/responsible-use/abuse.htm
3 Cornell Information Technologies does use cookies for network
tracking information, but not personal information-content-
about users. It does not sell e-mail addresses either, but, like so
many institutions, has fallen prey to commercial interests harvesting
addresses from its directories.
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Current Trends in lnformation Security
at Uw-Madison
At the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, the Information SecuritY
department within the Department of
Information Technology (DoIT) plays
an integral role in providing IT
services to campus. Our responsibili-
ties run the gamut, from responding to
someone whose computer has been
hacked to providing guidance on
developing security controls in new
applications.
What is lnlormation SecuritY?
lnformation security is the Protection
of the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information technology
assets, including hardware, software,
and the institutional information
stored therein. To implement protec-
tion and reduce risks, information
security controls are applied. These
controls can be categorized in three
areas:
r Administrativecontrols
. Policies and procedures
. Rotation of duties
r Technical controls
. Firewalls
' Virus protection
r Physical controls
. Locks
. Alarms
A well-known security concePt is
security in deprfi. Security in depth can
be achieved by applying a mixture of
various administrative, technical, and
physical controls.
While the term security tends to
denote absolute protection, informa-
tion security is actually more of a
continuum. The achievement of a fully
secured IT environment is rarelY
possible, but controls, such as intru-
sion detection systems, backups,
password criteria, etc., may help to
place you closer to the secure end of
the spectrum. As you imPlement
security in depth, you tend to increase
your security position on the con-
tinuum.
There are often external factors
that affect decisions about security
controls-primarily cost and conve-
nience. For instance, a firewall may
help to protect users from outside
threats, but it reduces the ease with
which users can access the Internet
and can be costly. As more security
controls are implemented, costs
generally increase and access to the IT
resource may be less convenient.
An important aspect in the
implementation of controls is risk
management: assessing what risks an
organization encounters and deter-
mining whether to accept the risk or
take steps to reduce the risk. Another
important determination in assessing
the level of security that an organiza-
tion needs is checking in with what
peer organizations are doing. Do other
universities deploy firewalls at the
campus level? Are they offering e-mail
encryption for sending confidential
data across the Internet? What are
their password controls? This sort of
peer review essentially sets the
standard of due care for IT security, an
important legal consideration.
What Are the Threats?
Hacked servers (sometimes just hours
after connecting to the Internetl),
copyright infringement viruses, denial-
of-service attacks, misuse of
institutional information and the loss
of reputation that goes with it ... The
list of possible security breaches goes
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on and on. It's probable that every university has seen its
share of exposures in recent years. The Computer
Security Institute and the FBI produce an annual survey
on computer crime and security and publish the results'
This survey, available at wwwgocsi.com, shows a
growing trend in both the number of security breaches
and the cost of the breaches. According to the 2002 CSI/
FBI survey, 90 percent of respondents detected security
breaches. Of those who reported security breaches, 80
percent acknowledged financial losses due to the
breaches.
Incident tracking at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison substantiates this growth trend in the number
of security incidents, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
graph in Figure 2 (page 26) shows a breakdown of the
types of cases reported to UW-Madison's Incident
Response Team:
Complaints about spam received and spam relaying
together constitute the majority of cases reported.
Reports of virus infections continue to grow, especially
after recent Klez virus outbreaks. Copyright infringe-
ment and unauthorized access, which includes hacked
machines, continue to make up a large number of the
cases we see as we1l. Tracking these statistics allows us to
strategically place our security controls and tools to
Figure 1: Incidents reported to BadglRT
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better meet the needs of our environment now and to
anticipate potential services in the future.
The Challenge ol Security in Today's Environment
Remember the mainframe days? A user's only responsibil-
ity was to know the password-one password. Application
developers merely had to notify the appropriate main-
frame administration staff when a new system went live
and voilal-security was built right in.
It's not quite so simple in today's decentralized
environment. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison,,
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Figure 2: Types of cases reported to UW_Madison,s Incident Response Team teams, such as FIRST (the Forum of
Incident Response and Security
Teams). In addition to collecting and
responding to incidents, we provide
investigative services, such as investi-
gating reported violations of UW-
Madison's appropriate-use guidelines,
and assisting 1aw enforcement agencies
with investigations and forensics, that
is, the preservation and analysis of
computer evidence such that it is
admissible in court.
. Expert consulting
By providing expert security consult-
ing services, we collaborate with other
IT staff. Expert consulting, a growing
area of business for the Information
Security department, includes
providing assistance in assessing
current security risks and suggesting
controls to reduce risks in a particular
application, across several integrated
applications, for the computing
environment, or for a specific operat-
ing system.
. Security tools and services
Another way we collaborate with
other IT staff is by providing tools that
assist them in improving their own
security. These tools include vulner-
ability scanning, antivirus protection,
and security best practices.
We offer campus administrators a
vulnerability-scanning tool that allows
administrators to run their own
comprehensive scans of potential
security weaknesses on their network.
We plan to enhance scanning services
by providing centralized, campuswide
scans looking for well-known, high-
risk vulnerabilities, such as Windows
Web server exploits. Other possible
enhancements include offering
additional scanning tools as well as
running comprehensive scans for
departments and assisting them in
interpreting the results and taking
corrective action.
We offer the enterprise version of
antivirus protection software to
departments at a volume discount.
This allows departments to deploy
antivirus on all desktops and manage
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everyone has a responsibility in
information security. Managers assist
by setting policy and direction.
Application developers consider
security throughout development and
implementation of new applications.
As systems become increasingly
integrated, developers need to consider
more global security needs instead of
focusing on specific applications.
System administrators keep current on
exploits and patches, turn off unused
services, and provide access control
privileges. Network managers watch
for suspicious network activity that
may indicate an attack. End users have
a responsibility to protect an increas-
ing number of passwords and creden-
tials across various applications.
How UW-Madison lnformation Security
Helps to Address These Challenges
In order to meet the challenges of
today's computing environment, UW-
Madison Information Security
coordinates the following services for
camPus:
. Awareness and training
Awareness is an ongoing effort for the
Information Security department, with
campaigns targeting students and
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employees. Based on current trends
we're tracking in student computing,
the two main areas where we need to
increase education among students are
the unauthorized sharing of copy-
righted materials and the use of virus
protection. Thus our awareness
campaign will focus on these areas.
Outreach to students is accomplished
primarily through information screens
provided during the account activation
process, posters, and videos posted on
our Web site.
Awareness to faculty and staff
focuses on tools, training, and services
that provide campus departments with
ways to reduce the risk to departmen-
tal computing resources. One of our
main ways of providing security
awareness to faculty and staff is
through Lockdown, an annual com-
puter security seminar for campus
employees.
. Incident response and investiga-
tions
Through the UW-Madison Incident
Response Team (BadgIRT) we provide
a centralized collection point for
tracking information security inci-
dents, analyzing trends, and collabo-
rating with other incident response
it centraliy. In addition, an antrvrrus
solution is available to students on CD
for a nominal fee or free of charge for a
downloadable version.
We offer SANS (SYstem Adminis-
tration Networking and SecuritY)
"Step-by-Step Security" guides to
campus. In addition, we have various
information security best-practice
documents and other resources
available to campus on our Web site,
www.doit.wisc.ed u/securi tY.
. Access control and securitY
administration
Another way we assist camPus is bY
providing centralized access control to
many campus enterprise business
systems, including the student
information system, payroll, budget-
ing, and financials. In this way, the
security concept of least privilege, that
is, the minimum level of access needed
to complete work functions, can be
enforced.
Future Directions
As we look at current trends, we try to
forecast future issues that concern
information security. Some of our
current areas of research and
development include firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, and virtual
private networks to help provide more
secure networking. While these
technologies are not new, there is a
significant challenge to implementing
them in a decentralized environment.
Our current efforts in addressing these
challenges will lead to a more robust
network now and in the future.
In addition, we are investigating
the deployment of public key encryp-
tion and strong authentication to
enhance the protection and verifiabil-
ity of confidential data being ex-
changed over the Internet. Our work
in this area has found that these
technologies, used in combination
with existing controls, offer great
potential for the future of securing
information resources.
There will always be some inherent
risk to IT assets. As we deploy tools to
mitigate the risk, new threats and
weaknesses are discovered that require
additional controls. Also, as IT shifts to
encompass emerging technologies,
UW-Madison's Information Security
department must stay ahead of the
developments by keePing basic
security concepts in mind'
Kim Milford, CISSP, JD, is the information
security manager, and Jetfrey Savoy, CISSP, is
information security officer at the University ol
Wisconsin-Madison. Reach Kim at
kim.miltord@doit.wisc. edu and Jetl at
irsavoy@doit.wisc.edu
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Magnussen: In view of security
concerns that have come to light in
recent weeks regarding the vulnerabil-
ity of our nation's infrastructure
(including utilities, water systems,
dams, telecommunications switches,
and other critical systems) to
cyberattack, how can universities best
protect infrastructure systems on their
campuses? Where are the key vulner-
abilities in these systems, via the
Internet or other channels, and what
precautionary or corrective measures
should campuses be taking over the
short and long term?
Safford: A few years back I was
director for supercomputing and
networks at TAMU. Back in 1992 A &
M was attacked by a very persistent
hacker. In fact, the incident was
written up in a book called At Largeby
Friedman and Mann. That's what got
me started in this field, trying to
understand the vulnerabilities and
defenses in a university environment.
The basics remain the same nine or ten
years later.
There are three main things that
universities should be doing:
firewalling, intrusion detection, and
security auditing or vulnerability
assessment. We developed at Texas A &
M the TAMU tools, which basically
had (1) a firewall, context sensitive, or
a packet filter that was oriented toward
university environment, (2) intrusion
detection that was oriented toward the
university environment, and (3)
security auditing tools that were
oriented toward the university
environment. Those three basically
provide your front line of defense.
Magnussen: All the tools that were
initially developed are still in use here
today: The firewall is Drawbridge
which is UNIX based. This program is
open source and is used at several
other universities. Along with Draw-
bridge, you wrote an application that
tests hosts against known threats.
These tests check to ensure that the
machine's been kept secure and
reliable
Safford: One thing I might add to the
answer, too, is that il was very impor-
tant at A & M that we had very strong
support from the provost and higher
level management who agreed that
security was important. And in some
cases that can be the hardest thing to
get. The technical issues can be dealt
with fairly easily, but getting the world
to recognize that there is a problem
and to do something about it in some
cases can be the hardest step.
Magnussen: As wireless and mobility
continue to emerge as an expected
network service rather than an add-on
option, what challenges and future
problems might we encounter? What
advice and guidance do you offer to
those planning wireless and mobility
projects? How will initiatives such as
the Wireless NYC Project be made
secure given the current limitations of
technologies?
Safford: We've got two different types
of wireless: the wide area wireless or
the cell-phone based connections and
the local area network wireless, like the
802.11 technologies. They're two
different environments. The wide area
wireless actually started out to be the
one with the most problems, and the
good news is that they're finally
actually converging on something
that's semi-reasonable, as the third
generation or 3G phones start rolling
out the data services on these have
Dave Safford, PhD
Manager, Global Security Analysis Lab, IBM
Dave Safford is the manager o{ the Global
Security Analysis Lab for lBM. He holds a
PhD in computer science from Texas A & M
University. Dave can be reached at
safford @watson.ibm.com.
Walt Magnussen is the associate director of
telecommunications at Texas A & M University
in College Station. He is also a member of
ACUTA's Publications Committee. Reach Walt
at wmagnussen @ ppfs4.tamu.edu.
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much better Protection. TheY're
based on native TCP' TheY can use
IPSEC. The technologY is a definite
improvement from the first genera-
tion that didn't have anYthing and
the second generation that had a
relativeiy new thing called WAP [a
protocol that extends Web informa-
tion to wireless devicesl.
Basically the 3G phones are doing
the right thing.
The local area networking is kind
of a repeat of the same thing,
although they are now kind of stuck
in the second stage. When theY first
rolled out, they had absolutelY
terrible security. The B02.i1B was
fundamentally flawed and in some
cases unfixable when it first started
out. It was terribly insecure.
The second generation is adding
another protocol,802.1x, which is
good enough for second generation.
This helps, but it's not perfect. For
most institutions, particularly the
university, we think that this is quite
adequate. I would not hesitate to go
with this in lhe university environ-
ment. But it's not a comPlete, long-
term fix. Probably 18 to 24 months out
we're looking at 802.11I which should
actually be a complete rewrite, third
generation, and wili actuallY have
pretty decent security. For now I think
the 802.118 with the 802.1x protocols
is reasonably good for the university
environment.
For the longer term, this kind of
gets back to one of mY strategies,
which is basically in the long term we
shouldn't be trusting the network
an)'way. A11 of these technologies try to
make the network perfect, and the
better long-term perspective is to say
that the networks aren't going to be
secure. We have to harden our hosts
and harden our connections between
the hosts with something like IPV6 [IP
version 61. I think we will see a shift
away from these temPorary or near-
term measures of firewalls and
intrusion detection and move on to
actually trying to soive the underlying
problem which is hardening the
individual hosts and connections from
host to host.
Magnussen: It sounds like what you're
saying is that security needs to be more
on the end nodes than on the network
itself.
Safford: Absoiutely. What you see riSht
now with the firewalls and intrusion
detections is actually kind of a band-
aid approach. We have to Protect
insecure hosts from their own
vulnerabilities. State-of-the-art in the
operating systems and applications
isn't there yet for the kind of Internet
threat we're seeing, so you put on these
protective barriers like firewalls and
intrusion detection and vulnerability
scanners to get the Posture good
enough to protect them against the
Internet. That's certainly something
that works now, but longer term we'd
like to move to something that doesn't
have firewalls, that a host is able to
withstand attack.
Magnussen: As advantageous as NAS/
SAN convergence can be, it has
drawbacks. Most vendors' NAS/SAN
gateways only let arrays from the same
vendor be joined. In addition, moving
storage out of the isolated data center
to access over an IP network puts it at
risk of intrusions that before were not
possible. Many industry watchers
advocate the use of Ip Security
(IPSec), Fiber Channel Security
(FCSec), and Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) to secure transport of storage
over the IP network. What are the key
vulnerabilities and challenges in these
technologies? What short and long-
term advice do you offer to customers
considering these technologies?
Safford: Network storage is certainly
one of those areas in which we have a
direct conflict between security
requirements and convenience and
performance. Particularly in the high
performance area, like supercom-
puting centers, the need is for flexible
availability of high performance
storage. So we've seen in the market a
lot of response in terms of products
that are fiber-attached, very high
speed, high performance, lots of
spindles, but are not terribly secure.
That is certainly one model of why you
keep your supercomputer or high-
performance center in a protected
environment. But it's not good from a
security perspective if you're going to
spread this all over campus and try to
maintain a centralized storage.
If you want to Put some security
on it, the best selection probably is the
IPSec approach. Here you're going to
pay a convenience penalty and a
performance penalty, so it's very
important to understand what your
users are doing, where they are, and
what their real requirements are. It's
interesting because rather than see the
industry converge on a middle-of-the-
road type philosophy where you have
middle level security and middle level
performance, we're actually seeing a
bifurcation here in which the industry
is kind of separating into two camps:
the ultra high-performance, low-
security camp and the lesser perfor-
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mance but more secure camp. I think
we're going to continue to see that
because there's just not a one-size-fits-
all solution for everything the universi-
ties need to do. So in high performance
cases try to contain it with physical
security, and for the general-purpose
distributors where security is more
important, go with something like the
IPSec type solutions. I definitely think
we're going to continue to see this
bifurcation in this particular sector.
Magnussen: Although outsourcing
security is still a controversial subject,
an increasing number of businesses are
electing to turn over the round-the-
clock monitoring of their intrusion-
detection systems, firewalls, and VPNs
to outside security service providers.
What are the major pros and cons of
this model for managing security?
What advice do you offer to customers
considering this model versus the in-
house approach found in most colleges
and universities?
Safford: Well, you're going to find
questions on both sides ofthe fence on
this one. At A & M we did roll our
own. That was a very viable solution
for that particular environment.
Fortunately we had some good people
working on this and were able to roll
our own solutions that were specifi-
cally tailored to our environment.
On the other hand, that's very
expensive in terms of personnel, and it
demands that you have on hand
people who have a high degree of
expertise in these areas. The other side
is the outsourcing or consulting like
we do at IBM. We work very closely
with IBM Local Services Group. We
provide them a lot of the state-of-the-
art tools. The advantage of going in
that direction is that you don't have to
grow your own expertise, and you
don't have to commit your own
manpower to it.
There is some economy of scale,
and there's also some economy of
performance in terms of getting the
very best tools that you might not be
able to afford otherwise. For example,
IGS does security for something like
ten thousand companies. Their
intrusion detection systems deal with
something like a million and a half
alerts per day. They developed, and
we've helped them develop, some
industrial strength software solutions
to automate the vast majority of this.
In a single site you might not have the
economies of scale to develop this type
of solution. You might not have the
expertise. An outsourcing company
has a pool of talented people that are
spread out over all of their accounts.
You don't generally get flareups or
incidents at all sites simultaneously, so
they can spread very good expertise
and very good tools over a very large
area, and therefore do it more eco-
nomically.
So there are advantages and
disadvantages both ways. I've done
both of them and they both work. you
can do both ways; it kind of depends
upon the size of the university, what
people you have, what level of
expertise they have, what level of
attack you're experiencing, and the
various economics behind it.
Magnussen: I agree. A campus with a
200-person IT staff has the same needs
as a campus with a 5-person IT staff.
Safford: Absolutely. And some of these
tasks, in particular things like intru-
sion detection and security auditing,
essentially take at least a full-time
person each. It's very difficult for a
part-timer, someone who has other
work to do too, to keep up with all the
vulnerabilities, the logs, and incidents.
You have the minimum commitment
of at least a couple of people and that's
just not feasible in the small sites,
while it is more feasible if vou have 200
people.
Magnussen: Although these are hard
times for many in the IT industry, the
status of information security profes-
sionals is on the rise-at least based on
how much they're getting paid. Vr4rat
advice do you offer to those consider-
ing careers in information security?
How important is certification from
associations or organizations such as
the SANs Institute and the Interna-
tional Information Systems Security
Certification Consortium? What are
the implications for colleges and
universities offering degree options in
this area?
Safford: This is an excellent question,
and I'11 be talking about that more
coming up. Two things are reallY
important for security professionals in
terms of preparing for a career in this
area. One is absolutely critical: a
strong, fundamental, theoretical
background obtained at a university,
preferably even graduate level. There
are things you end up doing that
require a very strong background in
the languages, algorithms, and
automata. We see peoPle trYing to
work in this field that don't have that
background, and they basically can't
succeed without that kind of formal
education. We get almost all of our
people here from a PhD, university
background. Even applied in the field,
that level of formal training is
absolutely critical.
On the other hand, it's also
important to have practical, hands-on
experience. We very much like people
who have worked in the open source
community and the Linux community
who have demonstrated the ability to
work in large programming tasks. That
shows that they can take ideas based
on formal training and apply them to
do interesting things. Practical
experience is very important both in
the programming space and in the
system administration space.
If someone hasn't been a system or
network administrator, they don't
really understand the nature of the
threat. They don't really understand
how important this is to people. They
don't understand that down time can
have really serious consequences. So I
think it's very important to have
workers with all those kinds of
variables: formal training and experi-
ence and ability to do programming
prorects. The ideal person is a PhD
who has written kernel modules and
has been the administrator in a
university setting or something like
that.
Magnussen: With either the under-
graduate or graduate degree programs,
how much of the curriculum today is
dedicated to security issues?
Safford: I think a reasonable amount is
dedicated to security. I think that
perhaps there's been an underappre-
ciation of the other basic courses,
which is kind of the fundamental
foundation on which You build the
security. This gets back to the issue
that the language, automata, and the
algorithm courses are very important.
I cannot overstress that. I think that
universities could put a little more
emphasis in two areas: basic crypto-
graphy and software engineering. Most
universities have some sort of software
engineering course. I think it's
important for that course or a
following course to deal specifically
with the issues of security. There is an
underappreciation of security
throughout the entire development
lifecycle-the requirements, design,
implementation, testing, maintenance,
and so forth. There's an underappre-
ciation in the entire industry of
security in these areas. We continue to
see things like 802.118 come out with
serious design errors. We see products
come out without basic requirements
for security where they say, "Well, we'll
put that security in version 2." We
continue to see code coming out with
buffer overflows and parsing errors'
It's clear we're not doing a verY good
job of educating on those aspects of
the development cYcle. So we're
actually here trying to write some
course material in those areas'
Magnussen: Like the initial version of
SNMP which was transPorted over
non-secure communications. That
doesn't give you a warm fuzzy feeling.
Safford: When you go back to the
origin of the Internet, with the TCP
and Telnet and FTR there was no
threat model. People did not even
understand there was a requirement
for these things. You can forgive them
their ignorance back then. SNMP was
kind of on the middle level at just
about the time that PeoPle started
realizing,"Hey, we need to do some-
thing with the requirements phase, we
need to at least put security against
our target threats in as a requirement."
We continue to see that. When you see
something with 802.11B, which is very
recent, coming out with serious design
ares
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Privacy Bills Before congress Have Major Differences
by Amy Worlton
Wiley, Rein & Fielding
Privacy legislation has received significant atten-
tion on Capitol Hill, but vast differences between
House and Senate bills diminish prospects for
enactment. The two major privacy bills differ
markedly on many elements, such as the scope of
activities for which consumer consent is required,
the degree of interference with existing federal
privacy laws, and whether consumers will have
access rights or a private right of action. The two
bills have some commonalities, as they both pre-
empt state privacy laws and require businesses to
adopt information security policies. But the
difficulty in reconciling these bills, along with
broad-based opposition from business groups to
both pieces oflegislation, suggests that Congres-
sional leaders will not reserve time in the busy
legislative calendar this fall to address privacy
issues.
ln the Senate
In May, the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee marked-up the Online
Personal Privacy Protection Act
(S. 2201), introduced by the Committee's chair-
man, Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-SC). The bill is
primarily directed at online entities such as
Internet service providers and online retailers. But
it would cover offline organizations if they collect
personal data via online advertisements or their
web sites. Moreover, the bill reported to the Senate
floor would empower the FTC to propose compre-
hensive rules to govern personal data handling
offline. Small businesses would be exempt.
The bill would also require covered service
providers to obtain users'opt-in consent to the
collection, use or disclosure of their "sensitive
information" (e.g., financial and health informa-
tion) and opt-out consent for other kinds of
personal information. Users would have a reason-
able right to access their personal information
stored by covered organizations, as well as a right
to suggest corrections and deletions. Organiza-
tions would face affirmative obligations to protect
the security of personal information.
Most commentators predict that the bill's chances
for passage on the Senate floor are slim. Industry
coalitions are expected to challenge the legislation
due to its creation of a private right of action,
broad FTC rulemaking powers and conflicts with
existing federal privacy laws.
ln the House
In the House, Representative Cliff Stearns (R-FL),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Trade and Consumer Protection, recently
introduced th e Consumer Privacy Protection Act
(H.R. 4678), which would apply both to online and
offline activities. The bill calls for notice and opt-
out consent when a business plans to use personal
information for purposes unrelated to a transac-
tion with a customer (e.g., to sell personal infor-
mation to third parties). It also requires businesses
to adopt security policies and take reasonable steps
in response to government security alerts. Non-
profit entities and small businesses that meet
certain eligibility criteria are exempt.
Self-regulatory programs, backed up by the
FTC, provide enforcement under the Stearns bill.
The bill blocks private actions and broadly pre-
empts state action. With the support of Chairman
Stearns and the co-sponsorship of the Chairman of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Rep.
Billy Tauzin (R-LA), the bill is anticipated ro pass
both the Subcommittee and the Committee. But
the bill could be slowed by limited support in other
House committees with jurisdiction over it and
among the House leadership.
Contact Amy Worlton at aworlton@wrf.com.
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errors, it shows that PeoPle doing
development and software engineering
discipline for this development are not
aware of the security-specific aspects.
Certainly that's something we need to
teach.
Magnussen: Lack of securitY is the
number one issue inhibiting enterprise
adoption of Web services, according to
a recent study by the Hurwitz Group.
In addition, one out of everY four of
the top 1,000 companies in the US has
a security flaw in its network infra-
structure that could cut off all of its
global and Web-based traffic, accord-
ing to another recent study. What does
the future hold for networking? What
are some of the predictions of leading
thinkers in the areas of carrier services,
network security, application integra-
tion, Web servers, and business Process
automation? Over the next 3 Years,
what fundamental changes do you see
occurring?
Safford: Let me throw out some other
statistics that I think are even scarier to
give you an appre-ciation ofwhat the
real underlying problem is.
One of the things that I think is
really interesting to do is look at the
trends. Look not only at what the
hackers are doing today, but also at
what they did before, and try to
predict what's going to be there
tomorrow and understand what we're
facing. You've probably seen some of
the CERT charts that show essentially
exponential growth in the discovery of
vulnerabilities in our system. What's
the problem? Why are we discovering
vulnerabilities in our software at the
rate currently of 5,000 per year, which
is 14 per day, just enormous numbers?
We've done some studies on this to
try to figure out what our research
strategy should be. Basically the
conclusion we've come to is that we're
dealing with systems of historically
unbelievable complexity. Your average
desktop PC represents something like a
hundred million lines of source code.
This is staggering. The Apollo moon
rocket had roughly a million parts in
it,747s have a million and a half parts.
We're dealing with something like a
hundred million lines of code. This is
complexity we've just never dealt with
before. What we're finding is that with
this hundred million lines of code, the
current software develoPment life
cycles I talked about are producing
code with the quality of about one
security bug for 1,000 lines of code. If
you do the math, that means that on
your desktop you've probablY got
something like 100,000 security bugs
on your system. These are just
phenomenal numbers. So we don't see
any near-term trend of vulnerabilities
going away, nor do we exPect to see
perfect systems any time soon.
Another trend that is very interest-
ing is that the hackers now are starting
to attack the clients. Universities and
business enterprises are then uP to a
sort of bastion mentality: "Let's put up
walls around our data center' Let's
keep the bad guys out with things like
firewalls." And what's happening is that
all the hackers are saying, "Okay fine,
you're going to Protect Your data
center; I'll go break into the client of
one of your administrators who's
authorized to come in, and I'11 come in
over his connection."
So it's not going to be adequate to
think about just protecting your data
center or just protecting your central
machines. You have to Protect the
entire system-the clients and the
network and the server. This is a
definite trend that we've seen. We've
seen it with things like the QAZ virus,
which grabs user names and passwords
of the clients. It's not just dealing
with one thing that's horrendouslY
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So it's not going to be adequate to think
about just protecting your data center or
just protecting your central machines.
You have to protect the entire system;
you have to protect the clients and the
network and the server.
complex, but also dealing with very
complex systems and cornplex hosts
and clients and servers and networks.
Looking at how we're approaching
it in research, n,e have basically five
main strategy areas:
l. The first one I mentioned rvas the
band-aid type approach. We have
intrusion detection, firewalls, and
security vulnerability scanners. What
we're seeing now is that these have
slowly matured.
The next step that's coming in this
area is the integration of all of these
different sensors. In the past, for
example, at A & M, we had one
intrusion detection system, one host
auditing program, and one drawbridge
program. And what we're seeing is that
the trend in thi. area is to recognize
that no one of these is going to be
perfectly strong.
You want to have lots of intrusion
detection sensors and auditing systems
scattered around. You want to do real-
time intrusion and real-time auditing.
We're going to see these frameworks of
security tools develop into things like
Risk Manager, which started in this
area, and other vendors have similar
things. We'll see the integration and
expansion of these sensors throughout
the university or enterprise. That wiil
definitely help rnake these tools a lot
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better by reducing false alarms, false
positives, and false negatives. you'll get
more meaningful and useful output.
I mentioned that IBM's Managed
Security Services deals with a million
and a half alerts per day. One of our
goals is to get this down to numbers
that are much, much smaller; that are
much more meaningful; that don't
represent misconfigured machines or
routine periodic scanning but actual
serious intrusions.
2. Our second strategy is to say, "Okay,
given our operating systems as they are
right now and tools as they are right
now, what can we do to make the
overall system more robust?"
The approach is to go to distribu-
tive and autonomic type systems.
Rather than having one central file
server, for example, you might
consider having file servers replicated
and distributed around so that if any
one of them breaks or is broken into,
we have replication and availability.
We can do things like cryptographic
crosschecking and cryptographic
protection of these files if they're
scattered around distributed systems
such that even if a minority of the
machines are broken into the data is
still confidential and secure and still
has good integrity. The idea then is to
say, "We11, if our individual compo-
nents aren't secure, let's distribute the
problem over a lot of them and
challenge the hackers to have to break
into a very large numbers of machines
scattered all over the place." Take
advantage of all these distributed
I:::'::.:#'s 
to make the svstem
Magnussen: So you're looking at
distributive data set that's actually
scattered across multiple machines so
that anybody pulling information only
gets a piecc of thc puzzle.
Safford: Right. In other words, it's kind
of fun to turn the problem around and
say, "We11, our problem is that we have
hundreds of millions of machines
connected on the lnternet and that's
not secure." Mai,be part of the solution
is to take advantage of those hundred
million machines scattered around the
Internet. You see things like grid
computing. In our own particular
research project on wireless security
auditors, we just announced a
distributed lvireless security auditor.
The idea is that rather than have a
human expert walk around r,r'ith an
auditing tool once a week, we've put a
little software application on
everybody's r,vireless client or notebook
and we have them continualiy auditing
the network for us invisibly and
reporting in, and in an autonomic
fashion recognizing misconfigured
access points and actually fixing them.
So part of the thing is to take these
unsecure components that are
distributed and take advantage of that
in terms of autonomic security.
3. The third area is to actually try to
attack the problem on the end host.
We've known for thirty years the
theory behind how to make operating
systems secure. This is the work that
rvas done by Roger She1l and the
department of defense in the original
orange book.
The theory behind how to make
these systems more secure is actually
lvell understood, but there are a lot of
reasons why it hasn't been done:
expensive softu,are, diffi culty, poor
user interfaces, niche market...a lot of
different reasons that are just excuses
for why the industry hasn't produced
robust, secure operating systems. But
it's something that can be done. The
theory is well understood; it's just a
matter of sitting down and doing it.
We're working with the oper.r
source Linux community to try to take
Linux not one step farther but two or
three steps forward in security. We talk
about the Linux system rnaybe having
a hundred million lines of code. One
of the things to do is to do good
engineering, good design, good
architecture such that the application
code-which is probably 99 of those
million lines of code- is not security
critical. Have the kernel be the only
thing that is security critical. If an
application has a bug, that's fine, the
operating systenl can contain it. The
operating system can keep it from
getting to things that it is not supposed
to get to, regardless of its bugs,
regardless of hackers attacking it.
So we are working with the open
source community, the LSM security
modules, and the NSA is working with
us with security enhanced Linux, SGI.
IBM and a large number of players are
working on this. Probably in the next
couple of )'ears you're going to see
distributions coming out that are
going to be much, much more secure
than existing systems.
4. Another thing that we've been
working on is a hardware assist. A
couple ofyears ago we shipped the
cryptographic co-processor called the
4758. Basically it's putting a secure
computing environment into hard-
ware-something you can use on the
server. This is a PC I-card you can put
in your server machine regardless of its
operating system. It has a very secure,
tamper-proof environment, so you can
do very powerful functions on it. Sean
Smith and I wrote a paper in the
September issue of the IBM Sysfems
lournal rn which we showed, in fact,
that if you have one of these, you can
do something like a Web server in
which you can give the hacker physical
control of the machine or the server
and the password for it, and he cannot
read a single bit of data, he cannot
alter a bit of data, and he cannot even
tell which valid users are reading what
bits of data. So these secure c0-
processors are a way of, on the server
side, moving the sensitive part of the
application into hardware, which is a
very good approach.
On the client side, as I mentioned
be[ore, the hackers are siarting to
attack the client. We also can put some
hardware in there to help protect the
one thing that the hackers are really
after, which is the authentication
information of the valid users.
Currently, pretty much everybody uses
user name and password. If we can get
this conversion over public-key based
hardware tokens, then we can authen-
ticate the hardware token on the client
to the secure co-processor hardware
on the server. Under this scenario, it
doesn't matter if there are bugs in the
software because the hackers can't get
to this strong authentication informa-
tion.
IBM's cofounder of the Trusted
Computing Platform Aliiance ITCPA]
has announced the formal specifica-
tion for what's called the TCPA chip,
the security chip. It's actualiy shipping
now on T30 notebooks, and we can see
it's really a major step forward because
it basically puts the authentication
lrom the client to the serrer into a
hardware chip. A person's private key
is generated on this chip, it never
leaves the chip, and it can be used to
do secure authentication to the server
in a way that we can say, "No hacker
can ever get that private key." So it's a
very important thing-hardware on
the client, and hardware on the server.
The TCPA chip, by the way. is one
of these major developments that I
think is very important to look at
because it's not just IBM, it's not just
Intel; 180 companies, including
Microsoft, IBM, and Intel, all major
PC players, have signed on to the
TCPA standard. We are going to start
seeing clients coming out with this
hardware built in such that we can
have the hardware foundation for
good client-server type communica-
tion. This is a very important develop-
ment and trend.
5. The final thing, which I mentioned
before, is the education aspect of it.
Industry and universities really need to
work together to educate future leaders
in the field to understand the secure
development life cycles, what's
important at the requirement stage,
design stage, implementation stage,
and what's a buffer overflow and so on.
How are they exploited? How do you
defend against those? Teaching all this
so that as the next generation of
software comes out, hopefully we'll
reduce this 100,000 bugs to something
considerably less. So we think that
education is very important and it
really needs to be a partnership.
lll
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Watching the Network
Whenever people open up a new business, one of their first concerns is
protecting their physical assets. Along with other security measures, they
install new locks and some type of burglar alarm. Universities, businesses,
and many homeowners routinely use burglar alarms to protect their
valuable possessions. When an unauthorized person enters a protected
area, the burglar alarm generates an alert. This alert can actually notify the
police directly or may notifr someone who is responsible for site security.
\.Vhen it comes to computer networks, however, many people fail to
take the same security precautions that they commonly use to protect their
physical assets. Failing to adequately protect access to your computer
resources can result in unnecessary network downtime, increased costs, the
loss of intellectual property, and even legal liability if a
compromised system is used to attack other computer
networks.
Computer networks, especially academic networks, are
exposed to a diverse group of users. Furthermore, these
users need to access the network from a broad spectrum
of locations. Ensuring that these various legitimate users
access only authorized resources while also preventing
unauthorized users from infiltrating the network can be
a very challenging task.
Know Your Enemy
Attackers fit into two broad categories: erternal and
internal. External attackers represent people who have no
authorized access to your network, whereas internal
attackers start with some type of authorized access to
your network. External attackers must penetrate your
network via a perimeter security device. Internal
attackers, however, can launch attacks from internal
systems to other internal systems or even systems on
other networks. (Attacks from this group are also called
the insider threat.)
Besides the type of attacker, another distinction for
attacks against your netlvork is whether the attack is structured or unstruc-
tured. Unstructured attacks are the least severe because the attacker is
usually working alone and may not have any specific attack targets.
Structured attacks usually involve more than one attacker, and the attack
may be funded by an external entity. These attacks normally have well-
defined goals and specific targets. Thwarting structured attacks from
internal attackers is the most difficult task for a network security adminis-
trator.
When attacking your network, attackers will target your network
devices (i.e., routers, switches, computers, IP phones, etc.) as well as the
network protocols that the different devices on your network use to
your network so that you can
identifir any unusual behavror
and identift situations in
which your security policy is
being violated, either due to an
incorrectly configured device
or an attacker bypassing estab-
lished security mechanisms.
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communicate with each other. These
attacks will usually model one of the
following different attack methodologies:
. Ad Hoc 
- 
Random probing and
attacking
. Methodical 
- 
Ordered comprehen-
sive probing and attacking
. Surgical Strike 
- 
Attack on a single
target
. Patient 
- 
An attack carried out very
slowly over a long period of time
. Blitzkrieg 
- 
An all out massive
assault against a network
Although all of these methodologies
incorporate the same basic data
collection and attack techniques, they
vary with respect to speed and compre-
hensiveness. A patient attacker is trying
to avoid detection and may perform
reconnaissance over a period of several
months, making his presence extremely
difficult to detect. ln a blitzkrieg,
however, the attacker(s) are conducting
an all-out massive assault on your
network in an attempt to either totally
disrupt network operation or mask the
real attack underneath the noise created
by all of the activity on the network.
Security Barriers
Numerous security mechanisms, such
as firewalls, user authentication,
VLANs, and VPNs establish security
barriers to prevent unauthorized access
to network resources. Using correctly
configured barriers such as firewalls to
protect the perimeter of your network
does an excellent job of keeping
external attackers from accessing your
internal system resources. Nevertheless,
they provide only limited protection for
devices such as public Web servers that
must be accessible from virtually any
computer connected to the Internet.
With the numerous threats from
assorted attackers, it is crucial that you
protect your network beyond the basic
perimeter security devices such as
firewalls. Just as physical locks can be
picked and keys stolen, the security
devices implemented on your network
can potentially be circumvented.
Therefore, you must be able to monitor
your network so that you can identifr
any unusual behavior and identiS,
situations in which your security policy
is being violated, either due to an
incorrectly conligured device or an
attacker bypassing established security
mechanisms.
lntrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems enable you
to monitor your network looking for
intrusive activity. An intrusion
detection system is effectively a burglar
alarm for your computer network. An
intrusion detection system monitors
certain characteristics of your com-
puter network, such as network
packets, host logs, or system calls.
Before entering into the explanation of
how an intrusion detection system
works, it is helpful to explain a couple
of terms that are commonly heard with
respect to the operation of an intrusion
detection system.
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Design and Operations Criteria: Trust No One
by Ron Walczak, RCDD
Walczak Technology Consultants
We live in a world where some peopie seem to
have too much time on their hands, and many
of these folks have creative talents that give
them the ability to crack security codes,
firewalls, and the like. What's worse, they can
do it in the safety of their own home from
halfivay around the world (our
communications server averaged nine
unauthorized access attempts one day in June
from points all around the globe). In addition
to routers, firewalls, and virus protection
discussed in this issue, another area of security
that should be given its due is the physical
security of your network. Focus with me on
minimizing the threat closer to home: physical
disruption and theft of service caused by the
people who work for, and reside at, your
institution.
Motivations to disrupt can include plain old
vandalism, anger at the institution or another
student (revenge), exuberance (we won the
game!), and boredom, to name a few. The
motivation to steal services needs no
explanation. And the motivations are the key
to protection. It takes more thought, time,
and effort to steal than it does to break,
making vandalism a more common problem.
So how do you minimize the opportunities for
these types of security breach? Consider the
following list of design criteria starting at the
wall plate:
. Metal faceplates do not crack.
. Angled jacks protect jacks and cables
against over-exuberant furniture moving.
. Surface-mounted raceways screwed to the
wall (not just adhesive) do not pull off.
. Cables in conduits do not get cut; cables
laid across ceiling tiles are fair game.
. Dedicated wiring closets that can be locked
without half the campus having keys to the
room is preferred to log entries. (Make
sure there is a manual key override.)
Card-key access is preferred. Installing
alarming devices in the room (access and
environmental monitoring) provides even
better protection.
. Consider alarm devices that monitor
connectivity status on ports. (Warning:
These products sit between your switch
and horizontal wiring. They insert power
on the cable to monitor connections-
effectively reducing your horizontal cable
speeds to 100 mbps.)
. Limited, card-key access to locked server
rooms is preferred to log entries. (Make
sure there is a manual key override).
Media storage should always be controlled
(locked up). Disks, CDs, tapes, ar.d zip
cartridges are easy to steal and are also a
potential source ofvirus attack.
. Speaking of media, how thorough is the
disk erase process you use when pulling
PCs from active service to discard or
donate? You DO use an erase program,
don't you?
Theft of service requires a bit more time
and usually a pilfered key to the wiring closet.
Most campus designs provide student
connectivity flexibility via patch panels in the
wiring closets. \{rho has time to actively
monitor whether a connected port has a
paying stbscriber? Once in the closet, an
ambitious soul with patch cords can become a
business unto himseli selling connectivity to
fellow students at a "discount." The
institution is most vulnerable during semester
startup when techs are running mad trying to
connect subscribers-leaving closets unlocked
or propped open.
Bottom line: You expose it, you risk it.
Ron Walczak is the principal consultant with
Walczak Technology Consultants, Inc., in
Prospect, Pennsylvania. Visit his Web site at
www.walczakconsultants.com.
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As with any alarm system, not all of the alarms
generated by an intrusion detection system represent
actual intrusions. Some alarms are triggered by
normal user activity. These alarms are known as false
positives. Controlling false positives is vital to
successfully deploying intrusion detection on a
network, since they erode confidence in the intrusion
detection system. Home burglar alarms can fall prey to
similar problems with respect to false alarms. After
responding to numerous false alarms, the police
response time is likely to increase due to the assump-
tion that any alarms are just another false alarm.
Another term that is commonly used is a .false
negative. In this situation, an intrusion detection
system fails to alarm on an intrusion that it is designed
to detect. False negatives represent a failure of the
intrusion detection system since they represent
situations in which the intrusion detection system
missed a monitored intrusive event.
To understand how intrusion detection systems
operate, it is useful to examine the different triggering
mechanisms an intrusion detection system can use to
detect intrusive activity and the locations within your
network that the intrusion detection system is monitor-
i.g.
Current intrusion detection technology uses trvo
major triggering mechanisms:
. Anomaly detection
. Misuse detection
Anomaly detection involves defining profiles that
represent normal user activity. When a user's activity
deviates from the established profile, an alarm is
generated. On the positive side, anomaly-based
detection systems will alarm on anything that falls
outside of the defined profile. This means that the
anomaly-based system can detect intrusions based on
attacks that it has never seen before. Furthermore, it is
difficult for an attacker to know what traffic he is
generating will be considered abnormal and thereby
generate an alarm. Associating the alarms generated
with a specific type of attack, however, can be very
difficult. In addition, during the initial training period
in which the profiles are created, the network is not
being monitored lor intrusive activity.
A misuse detection system (also called a
signature-based detection system) has a specific
signature for each intrusive event that it is watching
for on the network. With this system, the,
user knows exactly which types of
attacks the intrusion detection system
should detect. Whenever activity on the
netlvork matches one of these signa-
tures, the intrusion detection system
generates an alarm. Associating the
alarm with a specific type of attack is
rather easy, but a misuse detection
system can only detect intrusive activity
that matches one of its predefined
signatures. Therefore, an effi cient
signature-update mechanism must be
established to keep the misuse detec-
tion system current. Misuse detection
systems must also maintain state
(stored information) for signatures that
involve data observed across multiple
packets or data sources.
Network-based or Host-based Systems
Besides specific triggering mecha-
nisms, your intrusion detection system
must also look for triggering events at
different locations within the network.
Monitoring may be network based or
host-based.
Network-based intrusion detection
involves placing sensors at various
locations within your network. These
sensors capture network traffic and
analyze it for malicious activity. Each
one of these sensors is watching your
netlvork, looking for unusual or
intrusive activity. When a sensor
generates an alarm, this information is
relayed to a centralized monitoring
console where you can get a macro-
scopic view of your entire network.
This approach is similar to placing
cameras at various locations across a
campus (entry doors, labs, computer
rooms, etc.). A drawback to this
approach, however, is that it can be
difficult to determine if certain attacks
actually succeeded (e.g., an attacker
may have launched a Windows Internet
information server exploit against an
Apache Web server).
With host-based intrusion detec-
tion, a software agent resides on each of
the machines in your network. This
agent is looking for intrusive activity
on a single computer. These agents can
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either examine system logs or system
calls to find intrusive activity. Like the
network-based sensors, these host-
based agents can report to a centralized
monitoring console. Since host-based
monitoring relies on specific operating
system characteristics, you need to have
an agent for every type of operating
system that resides on your network.
Furthermore, host-based agents are
usually not available for infrastructure
equipment, such as routers and
switches. Correlating the information
from the individual host-based agents
into a network-wide perspective can
also sometimes be difficult. Neverthe-
less, the host-based agents can usually
provide positive confirmation as to the
success or failure of a specific attack
against the host that they are monitor-
irg.
Besides generating alarms when
intrusive activity is observed on your
netr,vork, many intrusion detection
systems can also react to attacks against
your netrvork by updating access
control lists on your routers and
firewalls to stop further attacks from
specific hosts. Host-based intrusion
detection systems that monitor system
calls, as opposed to system logs, can
also be configured to disallow mali-
cious system calls, thereby preventing
specific attacks from succeeding.
To be functional, an intrusion
detection system must incorporate a
monitoring location and a triggering
mechanism. The different monitoring
locations and triggering mechanisms
each have their own pros and cons.
Therefore, many intrusion detection
system vendors are incorporating many
if not all of these mechanisms into their
systems in an attempt to maximize the
functionality. These systems are
referred to as hybrid systems. One of
the more popular hybrid intrusion
detection systems currently available
incorporates both network-based and
host-based monitoring in an attempt to
get a complete picture of the activity on
the network, from the macroscopic
perspective down to the microscopic
perspective. You may also see a hybrid
system that combines misuse detection
with anomaly detection.
Meeting Today's Security Needs
Today's computer networks are
continually increasing in complexity.
lust a few years ago, a university
network consisted mainly of a few
computer labs and the network used by
the faculty and administrative person-
nel. Today, however, almost every
student on campus uses the university's
network. Many universities allow
students to register via their computers.
Other institutions have wireless
networks that enable students to access
the network from literally anlwhere on
campus.
Besides the number of people
allowed to access the network, the
functionality provided by a university's
network has undergone tremendous
growth. It is not uncommon for a
typical university network to support
numerous functions such as student
registration, IP telephony, e-mail, class
assignments, specific class Web sites,
and distant learning. Access to today's
university networks is extremely
diverse, making the problem of
securing these networks very compli-
cated. Deploying an intrusion detection
system can help monitor this diverse
network and verifr that the defined
security policy is being followed.
Earl Carter is a member ol Cisco's Security
Technologies Assessment Team (STAT) and
author of the Cisco Press book titled C,bco
Secure Intrusion Detection System. FoJ
additional networking technology and
certilication titles visit www.ciscopress.com.
Carter can be reached at ecarter@ cisco.com.
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lnformation Security Best Practices
205 Basic Rules
by George L. Stefanek
Published by: LLH Technology Publishing,2002. 194 pages.
architecture suggestions is covered. Several reference sections and a
bibliography provide additional useful information.
Overall, this book is a fast read that covers all of the essentials of
network security without getting bogged down in esoteric discus-
sions about strong encryption algorithms. It gives the reader a road
map rather than an encyclopedia and serves as a guide toward
greater overall network security. While the book does not go into
minute detail on every subject, all of the major aspects of network
security are covered. The CD-ROM version of the text (PDF
format) is convenient for quick searches, and it provides some
useful security utilities, such as one tool that can pull passwords
from a Windows workstation-handy for presentations to manage-
ment on why physical security is important.
I recommend this book to any network administrator of
intermediate to advanced skill who is responsible for the security of
a network. The nontechnical discussions help the administrator
make compelling arguments to management, while the technical
parts provide the basis for the overall plan.
Reviewed by: Justin M. McNutt,
University of Missouri-Columbia
Information Security Best Pracrrces, Iike many network
security-related books, is an interesting amalgam of the
seemingly obvious and the obscure. The 205 Basic Rules
mentioned in the subtitle provide a simple, straightforward
format that leads logically from one topic to the next.
The book begins with a discussion of the threats to a
network. What kinds of attacks exist? How do hackers break into
networked systems? Where are the greatest risks to a system?
The next section discusses security policies, how to tailor
those policies to a particular environment, and why manage-
ment support is critical to successful policy implementation
(and some tips on how to get that support). For reference, a
sample security policy comes on the CD-ROM included with
the book.
Chapters five through 19 enumerate the 202 remaining rules
(three are listed in the policy section). Every subject from
physical security to operating system guidelines to network
November 17-20
Long Beach Convention Center
Long Beach, GA
The League for lnnovationt annual Conference on
lnformationTechnology (ClT) is the premier showcase
of the use of information technology to improve
teaching and learning, student services, and
institutional management.
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Cybercrime: Are You Ready?
by Megan Statom Cybercrime includes theft, fraud,
malevolent activity, and espionage
carried out through or upon the
commercial and public information
telecommunications systems.
At the sixth annual National
Colloquium for Computer Security
Education in Redmond, Washington,
this past June, Richard Clarke, White
House special advisor for cyberspace
security, warned that an information
war is approaching,
and when it arrives
the $15 billion lost
every year to com-
puter hackers will
"seem like nothing."
Clarke acknowl-
edged that the
government is not
going to be able to
forewarn businesses
when a cyber attack
will take place. "Law
enforcement can't
save the private
sector," he stated.
What matters are the
vulnerabilities within
corporate networks.
Clarke says the most
vulrrerable networks
are the ones found in
college and university
systems, some of
which have little-if
any-protection.
Clarke urged IT
directors to push for
better security at their
own schools.
Communications technology
professionals must improve their
knowledge of cyber attacks and the
steps that can be taken to prevent and
recover from them. ACUTA will offer a
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three-day study of disaster preparation
and business continuity at the Winter
Seminars in Tempe this coming
lanuary 12-15. A good overview and
the usual first-class exchange of ideas
among peers will provide a valuable
introduction to this important topic.
For those who need even more, a
variety of certification and degree
programs are now being offered at
several institutions. Here are a few
examples.
The Cybercrime Studies lnstitute
Anne Arundel Community College in
Glen Burnie, Maryland, is home to the
Cybercrime Studies Institute. The
college partnered with The Winder-
mere Group, LLC, to create the
institute in order to offer training in a
high-tech computer training facility,
fashioned for cybercrime computer
and legal training. The institute offers
classes designed for employees and
consultants of companies concerned
about cybercrime and IT professionals
involved in network support issues.
Classes that can be taken at the
Cybercrime Studies Institute are
Network Security Fundamentals and
X::.- 
Defense and Countermea-
Network Security Fundamentals is
a 48-hour course for Windows NT/
2000 and UNIX network administra-
tors. After completing the course,
administrators should understand the
fundamental aspects of network
security, be familiar with common
techniques used to attack networks, be
able to create router security using the
functions of access control lists, and be
able to define the common Internet
components and techniques used in
Web hacking.
Network Defense and Countermea-
sures is also a 48-hour course intended
for Windows NT/2000 and UNIX
nehvork administrators who have a
firm knowledge of basic network
security. The course is meant to
provide administrators with superior
knowledge of network defense' It
teaches IT professionals how to take
protective measures for networks, the
different methods of intrusion
detection, network monitoring, and
countermeasures that can be taken.
"IT personnel are aware that the
threat of having your network attacked
is very real," says Elizabeth Harrison,
manager of the Cybercrime Studies
Institute. "The number of incidents is
increasing exponentially every year.
The problem is that too many network
administrators don't truly understand
how to protect the network. You
should know how to set uP defensive
measures to mitigate risk, not just how
to react to an attack if it haPPens."
When the series of courses has
been completed, the student is
recognized as a cybercrime specialist,
defined by the Institute as one who
"uses knowledge and skills of a legal,
business, and technical nature to detect
and collect evidence offraud, theft,
espionage, and malicious activity."
The Cybercrime Studies Institute
was established in April 2002.The
$1,350 fee for each class includes
instruction, Iab fees, the continuing
education certificate, and all course
materials. Students-a maximum of
12 per class-are generally network
administrators and technicians or
people who are seeking acareer
change. The program is unique in that
it is designed to be taken over a short
four-week period and then immedi-
ately applied on the job, minimizing
the chance for the skills learned to be
outdated when the program is
completed.
Computer Security at GWU
George Washington UniversitY
(GWU) in Washington, D.C., has
recently been certified by the National
Security Agency as a Center of
Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance Education. The university
offers a new graduate certificate
program in Computer SecuritY and
Information Assurance, a Plan for
those who need to zero in on the most
current knowledge in the sPhere of
computer and network securitY.
"When you're talking about IT
directors, you basically have trvo types:
the person who is in charge of the
management of the securitY of the
enterprise and the technician who
implements the technical solutions to
increase security," states professor
Dianne Martin, director of the Cyber
Security Policy and Research Institute
at GWU. "Our programs address both
types, and each needs further training.
The management and oversight of
security measures, from securilY
badges to the protection of floPPY
disks and CDs, requires a new level of
training because security problems
and capabilities are becoming more
and more sophisticated. What IT
professionals need to realize is that you
do have both aspects which have to be
addressed."
While GWU has been offering
computer security courses for years,
this certificate in Computer Security
and Information Assurance has only
been available for ayear. The program
consists of four courses related to
computer security: Introduction to
Computer Security; Viruses, Worms,
and Network Security; Information
Policy; and E-Commerce SecuritY.
Introduction to Computer Security
provides instruction on techniques for
security in computer systems, includ-
ing authentication, logging, authoriza-
tion, and encryption. Viruses, Worms,
and Network Security educates the
student about Web securitY and
intrusion detection, and about
protection against statistical inference.
lnformation Policy covers issues
related to privacy, equity, and intellec-
tual property, including criminal
justice and law enforcement implica-
tions. In E-Commerce SecuritY, IT
professionals discuss advanced
technical topics involving e-commerce
security, including X.500 registration
systems, X.509/PKIX certification
systems, secure payment methods,
smart cards, and authorization models
in open distributed environments.
Students can take the classes in
what the school calls cohorts in which
they take all four classes at a somewhat
accelerated pace. These Sroups are
typically 10-15 students per cohort. If
the student opts to take the classes
through open enrollment, the class
sizes are a little larger at 30-35
students per class. Most of the students
in this program are IT professionals
returning for more education and
certification in the area of computer
security. The program cost is $9,950'
which includes all books, lab fees,
student fees, and a light supper each
class evening.
The Canadian Centre for lT Security
The Canadian Centre for Information
Technology Security in British
Columbia provides education and
research on comPuter securitY and
high-tech criminal investigation. In
2000, the Centre, which is a joint
venture between the UniversitY of
British Columbia and the Justice
Institute of British Columbia, began
offering a certificate in Internet and
Technology Security.
The program covers all areas of
information security, encompassing 14
modules and 210 hours of instruction
and class work over nine months.
Participants spend three hours every
week in online learning, consisting of
online lectures, readings, research,
discussions, and assignments. In
addition, there is one face-to-face
meeting per week, which features guest
speakers, lab work, and other learning
experiences.
The Data Transmission and
Network Topologies Part of the
program studies how data is transmit-
ted across private and public commu-
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Managing the Threat from Within
Tad Deriso, Director
CHR Solutions, lnc.
By far the greatest threat to network security is internal
users of the network. From accidentally opening infected
e-mail attachments to setting up a small departmental
802.1 I wireless network without the help of the campus
IT group, users on campus constantiy test the limits of
network security.
Ron Hutchins of the Office of Information Technol_
ogy at Georgia Tech notices that the problems on their
network come from users'indifference to network
security. The campus network is ,.scanned,,hundreds of
thousands of times each day from the outside, and there
are robust protection tools to mitigate outside security
threats. But there must also be effective policies and
enforcement procedures in place to help mitigate security
problems that can arise from users,activities.
From a wireless perspective, 802.11 wi_fi networks are
proliferating on college campuses. David Hoyt, chief
information officer at Collin County Community College
District in Texas, agrees that wireless networks can be a
major cause of concern for potential network security
breaches. Because the technology uses unlicensed
spectrum, anyone with a wi-fi card installed on a laptop
can pick up the signals and create potential problems on
the network or use the campus network to launch offensive
attacks on other networks. Much has been written recently
regarding security for wi-fi networks, and network adminis_
trators should take those concerns to heart.
The communications professional can and should be
proactive and take steps to prevent the institution from
becoming a victim or an unwitting participant. Serious
nications networks, looking in detail at the transmission
methods, transport formats, and security measures used.
Students also learn how routers and firewalls are designed
and used to protect networks.
Another module, Network Security, covers in detail
the different Web application attacks that are prevalent
and the security defenses against them. It also studies the
main security protocols used today to secure different
applications and communications channels, such as e-
commerce and virtual private networks.
Students are usually IT specialists, system administra-
tors, auditors, law enforcement personnei, and corporate
security managers. There is a maximum of 25 students
per class. The cost of this program is $7,200, which covers
course materials and books.
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measures should be taken to educate users in the campus
community about network security and how each one can
act as a guardian of the campus network. This would
include providing examples of how users can inadvert-
ently cause security breaches and identi$ring ways users
can be aware of their actions. A policy statement, with
enforceable penalties for noncompliance, could be a way
for campus administrators to raise the visibility of
network security.
From an audit perspective, administrators should
make sure that all physical network devices are secured
and unavailable to others. Secured communications
closets, or secured cabinets in public storage rooms, can go
a long way to preventing any accidental or malicious
security breaches. Take a laptop equipped with a wi-fi card
around campus, and see how many wi-fi networks are
detected. This can tell you if there are unauthorized
wireless networks that may allow others to infiltrate
network security. For those that are detected, make sure
there are security provisions in place, and make sure your
internal telecom staffknows how to plug security gaps in
wireless networks.
While no network can be truly 100 percent secure,
communications professionals would be wise to take
immediate steps to implement enforceable policies and
procedures and increase awareness of the importance of
network security within the university community.
Tad Deriso is director of CHR Solutions, lnc., an ACUTA corporate
affiliate in Norcross, Georgia. He can be reached at
Tad.Deriso@ chrsolulions.com.
Sources say cybercrime is escalating at a rate of 500
percent per year. While that statistic can be staggering to
any communications technology professional, it should
not discourage us from protecting our institutions from
attack. It is absolutely essential for today's IT personnel to
be armed with the most up-to-date information available.
"The spotlight has been on cyber security in recent
months because a few government officials have said that
cyberspace is the next sector for terrorism,,,says GWU,s
Martin. "The whole notion of protecting our telecommu_
nications infrastructure nationally in this area is critical.
IT professionals have to step up to the plate.,,
Megan Statom is the ACUTA communications assistant. She can be
reached at mstatom @acuta.org.
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'A professional in the finest sense of the word." That's what most of her
colleagues say about this year's winner of the Bill D. Morris Award, Corinne
Hoch of Columbia University.
Corinne has earned a reputation as an organizer and a leader through her
dedicated efforts on her campus as well as her commitment to the association;
but since September I l, 2001, she will always be known to ACUTA members as
the one who called us to action and lead the drive to donate supplies for the
rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.
As President Maureen Trimm remarked at the presentation of the award at
the annual conference, "This year's recipient of the Bill D. Morris award was in
her Manhattan office, on a typical early fall quarter day, only a few miles north
of the World Trade Center. What the rest of her day was like, and the days to
come, tell me much about the personal qualities of grace under pressure; of
commitment to the students, staff, and faculty of her university; of
communications technology skills and inventiveness; and mostly about
connections to the larger community.
"That this larger community includes ACUTA is fortunate for us all, in that
[Corinne's] call on the listserve to inform us about ways in which we could
individually help survivors and rescue workers helped each of us around the
country to be a part of this community effort.
"In a panel discussion at the ACUTA fall seminar in Albuquerque, she
shared with us the many things she wished she could have been better prepared
to do in such a disaster, and of course, the many things she and her colleagues
did do.
"As her boss told me, she is the person the president of her university counts
on to help craft messages to students, including the broadcast messages sent out
in September to inform, calm, and console the community. In fact, she is known
as the'Rolm phone lady'by the students who hear her as the voice of Columbia
University."
Since joining ACUTA in 1990, Corinne has contributed to the growth of
ACUTA programs and services, especially the users grouPs. After being
introduced through the Rolm Users Group, she was asked to take on the role of
planning and coordinating the 10 users group meetings at ACUTA annual
conferences. She rose to this challenge, developing a set ofprocedures and an
annual timeline that have resulted in a polished Process.
For the past year, as chair of the Vendor Liaison Committee, she has
demonstrated once again her talents as a facilitator and her positive approach to
collegial relationships.
As Maureen Trimm remarked, "ACUTA is fortunate to have her as a
member, a volunteer leader, and a friend."
Congratulations, Corinne Hoch. You exemplify the qualities that we honor
in memory of Bill D. Morris: dedication, vision, professionalism, and leadership.
And they are correct who call you "a professional in the finest sense of the
word." 
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From the Executive Director
Continued from Page 48
continuing to view technologY as a
strategic necessity lor their campuses.
When it became apparent that
September 11 and the economY would
have a measurable effect on our
institutional and corporate members,
and on their participation in ACUTA,
the staff worked quickly to develop
recommendations for new programs
that would make the benefits of
ACUTA more accessible to members
with limited travel budgets.
We initiated a new series of post-
event audio seminars, making some of
the best-rated sessions from our
quarterly seminars available to
members by audio conference. I am
pleased to report that well over 400
people at nearly 150 different sites
have participated in these Post-event
audio seminars so far, and the
evaluations show that they have been
well received. ln addition, we continue
to offer audio seminars on hot topics
in the regulatory arena, which are well
attended as always.
In addition, the staff develoPed a
plan to reduce expenses by re-
examining every major ACUTA
activity and to develop new sources of
revenue. The board of directors
approved these recommendations, and
most have been implemented. Our
goal was to maximize the cost-
effectiveness of our operations without
having any negative effects on member
service.
Several publications that were
previously offered in print form have
been transitioned to electronic format,
thereby reducing costs and speeding
delivery to our members. The most
significant of these changes to
electronic format was the ACUTA
News. The publications committee and
staffworked very hard on researching
member preferences and redesigning
the newsletter as a quality electronic
publication. I hope that you will grow
to appreciate the new speed of delivery,
reliable arrival on the first business day
of each month, and the convenience of
being able to forward electronic
versions of the newsletter to other
interested people on camPus.
I am happy to rePort that the
ACUTA institutional membership has
remained very strong during the past
year. We retained well over 95 percent
of ACUTAs institutional members
from the prior year, and many new
institutions were added to the
membership. This is evidence of our
members' continuing satisfaction with
the return on dues investment.
Last year at this time, I rePorted on
enhancements to the ACUTA Web site
that reflect our migration to a portal
environment that will allow You to
customize the ACUTA home Page to
provide the information that best
meets your needs. Although we are
continually developing the site, we
have introduced several new features
this month, which are designed to
make the site more useful to you:
. By selecting your own username
and password, you can create a
"My ACUTA'home page that
provides access to a wide range of
members-only i nforma tion.
' You can customize news feeds on a
wide variety of technology and
educational topics, so that everY
time you log on to the ACUTA site
you will see the latest headlines on
the subjects that you have selected.
. In addition, you may tell us about
your job responsibilities, so that
you will receive information about
seminars, publications, and other
ACUTA products that are designed
to fit your needs.
. You can also update Your member-
ship records on the Web.
. Improved search capabilities will
help you sort through the resources
on our site to retrieve the informa-
tion you need to solve Problems on
a daily basis, and there are a whole
host of other imProvements that I
don't have time to mention here.
In tandem with the develoPment of
new products and services, and re-
examining our operations to maximize
cost-effectiveness, we have continued
to offer the programs that ACUTA
members value. The fournal continues
with four high-quality issues per year,
with another series of outstanding
articles, interviews, and excellent
advertising support from the vendor
community. In addition, we published
the monthly electronic Legislative/
Regulatory Update, and closelY
monitored federal regulatory activities.
We kept our members informed of
new developments and commented on
proposed regulations both indepen-
dently and in cooperation with other
higher education associations. We
continued to strive to produce the best
quality and most focused educational
programs anl,where, targeted to the
needs of higher education communi-
cations and networking technology
professionals.
As in any successful organization,
the accomplishments really belong to a
team. Every member of the ACUTA
staff team has contributed to many of
the projects that I have mentioned
today. So, I would like to thank the
entire ACUTA professional staff for
their outstanding efforts in a very
challenging year.
In summary, I am Pleased to rePort
that, in that very challenging Year,
ACUTA continued to move forward in
pursuit of new goals and strategies and
continued to develop new Programs
and services to meet the changing
needs of our members.
Thank you.
Ilt
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programs and services as we evolve to
meet the changing professional needs
of our current members and as we
reach out to new segments of the
higher education community.
I could not make this report
without acknowledging some of the
challenges that ACUTA has faced in
the last year. The tragedies of Septem-
ber 11 and its aftermath have, of
course, affected the United States and
the entire world in ways that are only
just beginning to be measured, and the
nation's associations have not been
immune to its effect. Like many
organizations in higher education and
other fields, ACUTA felt the effects of
these events in reduced attendance at
the programs that immediately
followed the attacks. I am pleased to
say that we bounced back in April with
a very well attended Spring Seminar in
Philadelphia, and we are also pleased
with the response to the 2002 Annual
Conference in Reno.
Prior to September 11, our
corporate affiliates and other vendors
in our industrv were already feeling
the negative effects of declining profits
in the telecommunications and
information technology industry. As a
result, some companies curtailed their
participation in the Fall 2001 and
Winter 2002 Seminars. However, I am
very pleased to report that corporate
support ofACUTA has also rebounded
very strongly, rvith combined exhibits
and sponsorships at the Annual
Conference in Reno exceeding last
year's conference by more than 30
percent. The college and university
market is strong, and our members are
From the Executive Director
Executive Directo/s Report to the Annual Business Meeting
Each year, I have the opportunity to
provide a report to the attendees at the
annual business meeting of ACUTA,
summarizing the activities of the
association's professional staff during
the prior year. We had good attendance
at the business meeting this year in
Reno, but not all members are able to
attend. For that reason, I will use this
column as an opportunity to share the
annual report with those who were not
able to participate in the business
meeting.
The year since we met at the 2001
business meeting at Disney World has
been an intense and active year for the
ACUTA professional staff, as it has
undoubtedly been for all ofyou.
As 2001-02 President Maureen
Trimm reported, it has been a year in
which we have worked alongside our
elected leaders and other dedicated
volunteers to reexamine ACUTAs
mission and goals, and to develop a
strategic plan that will effectively carry
us forward as an organization. Staff
members participated in strategic
pianning sessions with the board and
committee chairs and as members of
the teams that developed the objectives
and action items that will make this
plan a reality. The staff will aiso be
very involved in implementing the
action items.
I personally am very pleased with
the outcome of this effort. I believe
that our new strategic plan is a
visionary document that embraces the
many changes that are occurring in
both higher education and technology,
and it sets forth a realistic agenda for
the future of ACUTA. The plan will
guide the development oI new
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Cut your Go
Streamline
Bring it all I
Amcom
. Speech recognition
PC attendant console
Web-enabled information
and services via PC and
wireless devices
' Enhanced 911 notification
Never has unified communications been more important
to your faculty, administrators and students. Nevet has
it offered greater productivity gains and cost reductions.
And never has it been easier to implement and use.
Amcom CTI solutions. Designed with innovation in mind.
Built to last using industry-standard hardware, software and protocols.
SERVICES
. Professional system planning and project management
. Turn-key installation and end user training
.7 x24 x 365 support
PLATFORMS
Oracle database
Nuance . lntel/Dialogic
Windows NT' Linux
1-800-852-8935
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I. Student Services &Revenue Generation
in this track, you will learn about the telecom and lT services
students are demanding and cost-effective ways in which to de-
liver them. You'll explore new opportunities to generate revenues
and to fund IT operations in the wake of declining commissions
in traditional student long-distance resale.
L Developments in Communications
Technologies & Applications
This seminar will provide updates on technologies that are evolv-
ing such as IP telephony, IP video, speech recognition, and unified
nessaging. Support applications such as customer relationship
L' lgement systems, content management systems, and other
inlrovations that impact campus networks will also be featured.
Denven, CO
Marriott City Center
II. Best Practices in Data Networking
Data professionals and managers responsible for campus network
operations will share their experienccs regarding the unique demands
of university networks. Case studies will cover the limitations of vari-
ous media used for transmission, network redundancies and quality
of service, techniques for bandwidth management, network security
issues, and the impact of putting voice traffic on the data network.
For more details or to register online, visit ourWeb site at
Winter Serninars
JanuaYy 72-15,2003
Tempe,AZ
Wyndham Buttes Resort
II. Disaster Preparation &
Business Continuity
Attendees will learn risk assessment techniques as well as ways
to develop practical disaster plans. Techniques to evaluate risks
and the potential costs of recovery will be covered, and spe-
cific campus examples wili be offered. Protection of telephony
as weil as network facilities rvi11 be discussed.
